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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND TRIBAL
PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES
GLORIA VALENCIA-WEBER*
CHRISTINE P. ZUNI**
INTRODUCTION
The essential Navajo value is that while men and women are
distinct, they relate as complementary equals. That kind of relationship
creates, or should create, an environment that views violence toward
women as deviant behavior. Under Navajo common law, violence toward
women, or mistreatment of them in any way, is illegal.'
A man who battered his wife was considered irrational and thus
could no longer lead a war party, a hunt, or participate in either. He
could not be trusted to behave properly. . . . He was thought of as
contrary to Lakota law and lost many privileges of life and many roles in
Lakota society and the societies within the society.2
What we do know is that in most Native American societies men's
and women's roles were delineated in such a way that violence against
Associate Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law.
Visiting Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law, Isleta/San Juan
Pueblo.
Both authors serve as primary faculty for the American Indian Law Certificate program at
the University of New Mexico (UNM) School of Law. The program provides an opportunity for
extensive coursework in Indian law for all students. The school's enrollment for 1995-96 includes
thirty-four students who are American Indian. The curriculum planning done by Prof. Valencia-
Weber involves regular contact with tribal nations and their members. Prof. Zuni is the clinical
supervisor for the Southwest Indian Law Clinic through which UNM students work with tribal
governments and their courts.
This article is a collaborative product for which Professor Valencia-Weber was primarily
responsible for drafting sections I and II; Professor Zuni was primarily responsible for sections
III and IV.
I James W. Zion & Elsie B. Zion, Hozho' Sokee'--Stay Together Nicely: Domestic Violence
Under Navajo Common Law, 25 ARIz. ST. L. J. 407, 413 (1993) [hereinafter Zion & Zion]
(discussing Navajo violence towards women).
2 Debra Lynn White Plume, The Work of Sina Waken Win Okolakiciye-Sacred Shawl
Women's Society, in CAROLYN REYER, CANTE OHITIKA WIN (BRAVE HEARTED WOMEN) IMAGES
OF LAKOTA WOMEN FROM THE PINE RIDGE RESERVATION, SOUTH DAKOTA 67 (1991).
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women among their own groups did not seem to be a common and
regular practice.3
We were always taught that women were sacred and that everything
in the home belonged to the women. Our extended families used to live
together and no one would have ever thought of abusing women and
children. It wasn't until families started to move into town or to move
away from each other that we started to hear stories about someone
beating up his wife.'
The physical abuse of American Indian5 women is a subject now
emerging from the netherland of ignorance which has surrounded the lives
of contemporary indigenous people in the United States.6 That American
Indian tribes have been recognized as the first sovereign within the
boundaries of the United States is not a fact consciously acknowledged by
many citizens governed by the other two sovereigns: the state and the
federal governments. Many presume that American Indians are just
another ethnic minority within this republic.7 Additionally, non-Indians
often assume that the popular media's depictions of contemporary Indian
life are accurate.
The purpose of this article is to discuss openly the issue of the
physical abuse of American Indian women in a manner that reflects the
Lemyra DeBruyn, Beverly Wilkins, and Karen Artichoker, It's Not Cultural: Violence
Against Native American Women 2 (Nov. 30, 1990) (citations omitted) (unpublished paper
prepared for American Anthropological Association meeting, on file with the St. John's Law
Review) (discussing tribes before European contact); see also Lemyra M. DeBruyn, et al. Helping
Communities Address Suicide and Violence: The Special Initiatives Team of the Indian Health
Service, AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH, Mar. 1988, at
58 (indicating that domestic violence exists in Native American communities due to poverty,
isolation, alcohol abuse, low self-esteem, and unique status in relation to federal government).
4 Charon Asetoyer, Public Denial, Private Pain, HEALTHWIRE, Jan. 1994, at 1 (quoting
Clarence Rockboy, elder of Yankton Sioux Tribe).
5 The term "American Indian" shall be construed to include American Indians and Alaskan
Natives for the purposes of this article. Alaskan Natives, Aleuts, Inuits, and native Hawaiians
maintain distinct cultural identities, but these are not pursued for the purposes of this article. The
term "tribes" is also used throughout the article; however, the indigenous nations use varied
terms for their collective identity, e.g., nation, pueblo, band, community, rancheria, colony, and
village. The most recent listing of "entities" which are federally recognized demonstrates the
variety of self-designations used by the indigenous nations. See Notice, 60 Fed. Reg. 9250
(1995).
6 Although the incidence of domestic violence among American Indians is under-reported,
some reports state as many as one-third of all women are physically abused during their lives.
See James 0. Mason, The Dimensions of An Epidemic of Violence, 108 PUB. HEALTH REP. 1
(1993).
1 See generally Sandra Guerra, Note, VotingRights and the Constitution: The Disenfranchise-
ment of Non-English Speaking Citizens, 97 YALE L.J. 1419, 1422 n.21 (1988) (listing American
Indians among minorities as specified by Bureau of the Census).
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authors' knowledge of how American Indian people live.' This article
confronts presumptions or pre-existing notions about the indigenous people
of the United States that pervade popular culture.
American Indian societies generally hold a common world view that
seeks to achieve balance or harmony in all relationships.9 The cultural
principles of American Indians, reflected in this world view, do not
espouse or approve of the abuse of women. While this statement
encompasses the approximately 550 tribes recognized by the federal
government, t0 the authors' knowledge of the traditional values and beliefs
of contemporary tribal people sustains the broad application. Although
there are differences among the tribes, respect for the physical integrity of
women is not an area where cultural values among tribes differ significant-
ly. Individuals in any society have always attempted to use physical force
to control others and American Indians are not exempt from what continues
I The background for this study arises from the authors' own experiences and from the
generosity of tribal people who provided tribal codes, court orders, and descriptions of
intervention programs. The authors are indebted to the courts of the tribes included in this survey:
Tina Gouty-Yellow, Menominee Nation; Eileen Lente-Kasero and Judge William Bluehouse
Johnson of the Laguna Tribal Court; Ada Pecos Melton and Eidell Wasserman of the National
Indian Justice Center; Lemyra DeBruyn and Beverly Wilkins of the Special Initiatives Team,
Mental Health Services, Indian Health Service; Mark Van Norman and the Cheyenne River
Sioux; Chad Smith and the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma; Judge Carey Vicente and the Jicarilla
Apache; James Zion, and the Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation; Judge Violet Lui Frank and
Demetria Valenzuela of the Pascua-Yaqui Tribal Court; Elsie B. Zion Redbird of Native Rights
Advocates and Instructor, University of New Mexico; Toby Grossman at the American Indian
Law Center; Evelina Z. Lucero, Instructor, University of New Mexico and UNM-Valencia
Campus; Darlene Correa, Laguna Family Services, and Professor Margaret Montoya, our
colleague at the UNM School of Law. The authors would also like to acknowledge the Albuquer-
que Women's Shelter, Women's Community Association and Connie R. Martin. Domestic
Violence Commissioner, for statistical information provided on Native Americans. Additionally,
the authors would like to acknowledge the legal research assistance of Sandy Gardner and Kyle
Nayback.
" Seegenerally Clara Sue Kidwell,AmericanIndianAttitudes TowardsNature, A Bicentennial
Perspective, in CONTEMPORARY NATIVE AMERICAN ADDRESS 277 (John R. Maestas ed., 1976)
(stating common tribal world views with central tenets of reciprocity or harmony with nature).
10 Approximately 550 tribal government entities are the indigenous nations of concern in this
paper. Entities recognized as sovereigns and eligible for benefits and services from the United
States (primarily the Bureau of Indian Affairs) include 311 tribal entities in the lower 48 states
and 226 Alaskan governmental entities. See Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 54364 (1993). Status as a
sovereign nation, with the power of self-governance over communally owned territory, does not
exist for some Alaskan organizations and corporations recognized by the federal government as
eligible for federal programs. Additionally, there are some 230 "extant and functioning tribes"
which have not been recognized by the federal government. Rachael Paschal, Comment, The
Imprimatur of Recognition: American Indian Tribes and the Federal Acknowledgment Process,
66 WASH. L. REv. 209 (1991).
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to be an unfortunate human behavior." The fact that individual members
of tribes, predominantly male, engage in the physical abuse of women does
not mean that such behavior satisfies a culturally approved norm.
Like non-Indian jurisdictions in the United States that use various
means to redress abusive situations, there are certain differences in the way
tribes, as nations, protect their female members. Rather than a single
Indian model, there are many; each tribe's practices derive from a blend
of its cultural, historical, and contemporary experiences.
Initially, this article will examine the sovereign nature of the tribal
nations within the parameters of both international law and United States
jurisprudence. 2 This article will also address the way in which some
international instruments relate to the rights and protection of indigenous
people, including specific provisions for protecting women. 13 Further-
more, this article will provide an overview of the American Indians' shared
world view, revealing values in sharp contrast to those of the majority of
American society.'4 The lives of indigenous peoples are anchored upon
communal values, rather than individualism, as the primary guide to
behavior. Finally, this article will demonstrate how some tribes seek to
protect their female members through codes, customary law, and
intervention programs which provide services to victims, abusers, and their
families."
" Government agencies and the media sporadically report that tribal women are the victims
of domestic violence. Three deaths among Navajos due to domestic violence, within a one month
period in 1991, instigated the study and legislation enacted by the Navajo Nation. Mark Trahant,
Native Perspectives, Gannett News Service, June 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
GNS File. Obtaining protection is not easy for many Indian women because of jurisdictional
uncertainties. Whether a state or tribal government enforcement agency can help depends on the
ethnic identities of the victim and the abuser and where the conduct occurred. See, e.g., Beatrice
Medicine, North American Indigenous Women and Cultural Domination, 17 AM. INDIAN
CULTURE & RES. J., 121, 124-25 (1993); Robin Abcarian, A County Reaches Out to Help
Battered Women, DET. FREE PRESS, May 13, 1990. Our review did not obtain national data
reporting domestic violence according to ethnic identity. One county in New Mexico that collects-
and reports detailed data across four ethnic populations indicates that American Indians experience
domestic violence as victims or abusers in proportions similar to the population as a whole.
FAMILY CRISIS CENTER, INC., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TASK FORCE SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, SAN
JUAN COUNTY 7 (1993) (noting that San Juan County Native Americans constitute 36% of
population, 40% of victims and 37% of abusers in reported domestic violence incidents).
12 See infra notes 16-76 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 41-44, 56-70 and accompanying text.
'4 See infra notes 77-129 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 130-341 and accompanying text.
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I. THE INDIGENOUS NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. LAW
The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, "inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished. " Before the
coming of the Europeans, the tribes were self-governing sovereign
political communities. Like all sovereign bodies, they then had the
inherent power to prescribe laws for their members and to punish
infractions of those laws.'
6
American Indian tribes existed as sovereign nations before the
European invasion of the North American continent. 7 This sovereign
status persisted through the subsequent wars and resolutions of conflicts
among the European powers. Each European power dealt in practical ways
with the tribal nations to maintain a competitive advantage with other
nations. France and England, for instance, recognized the tribes as
sovereign nations if this recognition would give them an advantage over a
competitor in trade or military alliances. Similarly, the newly formed
United States treated the tribes as sovereign nation-states. 1" The history
of the encounters among all of the sovereigns reflects pragmatic concerns,
with theoretical frameworks as a delayed or collateral development.
As noted, both European colonial powers,' 9 and the United States
16 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978) (citations omitted) (quoting FELIX
S. COHEN HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945)).
"7 See Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Note, Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering
the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 511-14 (1987)
[hereinafter San Kronowitz] (describing international law status of tribes as sovereigns during
colonial period in United States). Undeniably, the separate and independent quality of tribal
sovereignty changed over time. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court decisions limiting tribal power
affirm the continuance of tribal sovereigns. See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 725. 733
(1983) (holding no single notion of tribal sovereignty nor presumption of preemption precludes
state power where Congress delegated to tribes and states the regulation of liquor): Wheeler, 435
U.S., at 323 (rejecting double jeopardy where tribes exercise the sovereignty not withdrawn by
treaty, statute, or by implication as necessary result of their dependent status); McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973) (noting that despite trend toward
federal preemption, Indian tribes remain "a separate people, with the power of regulating their
internal and social relation"); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) ("[Ihe question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them.").
,s See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 679 (1989).
19 See generally FELIX S. COHEN HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47-58 (1982)
[hereinafter COHEN, 1982] (summarizing basic tenet under law of nations in pre-Revolutionary
period that American Indian nations are sovereign powers whose governments and ownership of
land should be honored). In this period, Francisco de Victoria and others established the
recognition of this nation-state status which was not subordinated or obliterated by European
powers' claims based on divine rights or discovery. Id. Intense legal and religious disputes about
1995]
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Constitution' originally recognized American Indian Tribes as nations.
Supreme Court decisions have continued to uphold this political status.2
The autonomy of Native American tribes to act as discrete governments
persists' even though congressional acts and federal court decisions have
limited the power of the Indian sovereigns. 3
The American Indians' status as tribal nations immediately distinguish-
es them from other ethnic populations within the United States. The tribal
status as a sovereign is both pre-constitutional and extraconstitutional.24
In jurisprudential terms, this means that the equal protection and due
process doctrines do not necessarily resolve issues in Indian law. 5
theories on the status of the indigenous people in the New World arose in the Spanish monarchy
after the initial experiences in the Americas. The basic tenets of the sovereignty which de Victoria
advocated survive in contemporary American Indian law. See also San Kronowitz, supra note 17,
at 509-22, 586-621; Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status
of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983) [hereinafter
Williams, Jr., Medieval and Renaissance Origins].
' Constitutional recognition of the tribal nations is founded upon the exclusive federal
authority empowering Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Another provision
excludes Indians from those persons to be counted as part of the U.S. population for purposes
of determining representative districts or apportioning direct taxes. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl.3.
Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (restating exclusion of "Indians not taxed" while eliminating the
limitation on counting slaves). Other provisions in the Constitution which provide exclusive
federal power over Indian affairs include the treaty power, the war power, and the power over
federal property. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See
generally, COHEN, 1982, supra note 19, at 58-74 (covering nation-to-nation relations and treaties
between Indian tribes and emerging U.S. republic during Revolutionary War and early Consti-
tutional periods).
21 The Supreme Court has maintained the status of American Indian tribes as sovereigns
within the U.S. from the Marshall Court through its most recent decisions. They are "distinct
[independent] political communities" whose status as sovereign governments was not lost because
of a protectorate relationship with the United States. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
557-59 (1832). The tribes are qualified to exercise powers of self-government due to their
inherent or original tribal sovereignty, not because of a delegation of power from the federal
government. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1991 (1993);
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 508
(1991); United States v. Wheeler, 425 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978); see also Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (affirming that tribal nation's powers neither arose from, nor were created
by Federal Constitution, but existed prior to it).
2 See supra note 21; 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994) (defining jurisdictional territory of tribal
governments to include more than reservations or federal trust lands reserved for tribes). "Indian
Country" includes dependent Indian communities and land held in fee by non-Indians if within
tribal boundaries. See Sac & Fox Nation. 113 S. Ct. at 1991 (affirming Indian Country statute).
I See, e.g., infra note 255 (discussing federal government restrictions on tribal criminal
authority over non-Indians).
2 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 112 (1988).
1 Cf. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding tribal sovereignty and
immunity require dismissal of equal protection claim under Indian Civil Rights Act); Morton v.
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Although a unique nation-to-nation status exists between tribes and the
federal government, shifting federal policies since the formation of the
United States have limited, defined, and complicated tribal autonomy.
Legal complexity arises from the conflict inherent between tribal sovereign-
ty and the concurrent doctrine of the federal government as trustee for the
tribal dependent. 26 Unlike other U.S. citizens, American Indians as
individuals have overlapping citizenship rights within three sovereigns -
tribal, state, and federal. The nature and extent of tribal autonomy is a
recurring legal question that complicates interactions among these three
sovereigns. z7
The tribal sovereign's status is key to understanding how American
Indian governments act to protect women. Tribes use inherent authority'
and cultural means which are distinct from the authority and means used
by state and federal governments. Like non-Indian jurisdictions, tribes
protect women through governmental structures. Some tribal governments
are similar to non-Indian governmental entities, where executive,
legislative, and judicial branches are identifiable.29 These descriptors,
however, do not necessarily define how these branches operate in tribal
governments. In some Pueblo communities, for instance, domestic disputes
are resolved through traditional proceedings conducted by the Governor of
the Pueblo, who is not categorically a judicial officer.3"
The protection of women by tribal governments stems from cultural
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (determining tribal political status and federal policy of Indian
preference prevail over constitutional claims).
I Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a
Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461 (1991) (describing cyclical, anomalous, and
complex relationship between tribes and federal government).
_7 See id.
,8 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (recognizing existence of some
"inherent powers" in Indian tribes).
29 See generally SHARON O'BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 198-200
(1989) [hereinafter O'BRIEN, TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS] (describing range and scope of subject
matter jurisdiction of tribal governments).
I Ernesto Luhan, Traditional Dispute and Conflict Resolution, Conference paper presented
to Indigenous Justice Conference: Justice Based on Indian Concepts 4 (Dec. 8-9, 1993) (paper
on file with authors). The appeal of a trial court decision is made to the tribal council in some
tribes while others reserve appeals to a separate judicial branch. The variety of tribal courts is
summarized in the DIRECTORY OF TRIBAL JUDICIARIES AND COURTS OF INDIAN OFFENSES,
TRIBAL GOV'T SERVS., BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (Dec. 1993). The directory includes judicial
systems established by the tribal nation pursuant to its inherent authority and the Courts of Indian
Offenses established under the authority of the Secretary of Interior. The Directory includes tribal
judiciaries which do not receive funding from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. For further
information on tribal courts, see Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative
Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225 (1994).
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values. Tribal societies retain and integrate cultural values into the
contemporary responsibility of tribal governments. The goal of maintain-
ing harmony among members of the community perpetuates traditional
dispute resolution methods that employ elders, peacemakers, and designated
persons (such as the Pueblo Governor) to serve as mediators and decision
makers.3' Traditional tribal methods of dispute resolution do not fit within
the adversarial model, but rather aim to restore harmonious relationships
among spouses, domestic partners, family, clan, and community mem-
bers.32 To be val,id judgments about how women fare in these tribal
communities must be based upon the legal and cultural frameworks that
apply to the indigenous people of the Americas.
A. Indigenous Peoples in International Law
Recent attempts by the international community to address the status
of the indigenous peoples of the world include an examination of Native
American tribes.33 In the countries invaded by European powers, the
natives resisted the invaders' common initial practice of exterminating
indigenous populations as human beings, nations, or as cultures.
Historically, under international law, native populations became protected
from annihilation and were allowed to assimilate into the dominant political
society.34 In the post-colonial period, nation-states resisted recognizing
distinct ethnic and cultural groups within a country's boundaries.3"
Whether in the former U.S.S.R. with its multitude of ethnic populations,
numerous Latin American countries with Indians, or Sweden, Norway, and
Finland with the Samis, the dominant nations argued that no distinctions
existed among their citizens and that all possessed only one national
identity.36 Later instruments, such as Convention 169, the Convention
3 See, e.g., Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 423 (noting Navajo's use of Peacemaker Court
based on traditional tribal values).
32 O'BRIEN, TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, supra note 29, at 202.
33 See generally, DAVID H. GETCHEs, ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS § 15 (1993); ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1201-1304 (3d ed. 1991); S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and
International Law in Historical and Contenporary Perspective, in 1989 HARV. INDIAN L. SYMP.
191 (1989).
3 Russel Lawrence Barsh, An Advocate's Guide to the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 209 (1990).
35 San Kronowitz, supra note 17, at 593-95 (discussing "blue water" approach to protect
territorial integrity of existing post-war states by limiting recognition of indigenous peoples to
geographically separated peoples). See generally Douglas Sanders, The UN Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, 11 HuM. RTS. Q. 406, 412-18 (1989).
3 See, e.g., San Kronowitz, supra note 17, at 591-92 n.450 (discussing Latin American
Nations' full political integration).
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Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries of the
International Labour Converence ("ILO"), 3 7 generated new ways of
perceiving and respecting the rights of indigenous people in the collective
and as individuals. International law is now wrestling with the persisting
question of how to treat the distinct indigenous populations found
everywhere in the world.
The emerging norms, most recently stated in the products of the U.N.
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, expand the view of the
indigenous peoples. Consequently, the nature of their rights is changing.
Current dialogue involves the nation-states, the indigenous peoples (usually
represented by nongovernmental organizations), and the international
structure or forum such as the United Nations (U.N.), that mediates this
dialogue.38 Significant differences exist among proponents about key
concepts and definitions regarding the legal status of indigenous populations
and land. One of the central disputes is the indigenous populations'
demand to qualify as autonomous nation-states and their resistance to a less
autonomous status as "a people" or "a minority." "
American Indians continue to possess the key characteristics of the
sovereign state: a distinctive permanent population; a defined territory,
with identifiable borders; a government exercising authority over territory
and population; and the capacity to enter into relationships with other
nation-states.' In this regard, the American Indian nations can generate
models on how indigenous peoples can protect their communal interests,
including the well-being of their female members.
B. Indigenous W4bmen in International Law
The protection of women as members of indigenous communities has
not been specifically addressed by international legal doctrines. Rather,
women have been considered in a generic sense. All women who are
11 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, I.L.O.
CONy. 169, I.L.O., 76th Sess., [hereinafter ILO] reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989); see also
Barsh, supra note 34, at 237 (providing text of International Labour Conference Convention
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989)). See generally
INDIAN RIGHTS-HUMAN RIGHTS: HANDBOOK FOR INDIANS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS'
COMPLAINT PROCEDURES (Indian Law Resource Center 1984) (providing text of major human
rights instruments and procedures).
I See Sanders, supra note 35. See generally Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous
Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 127 (1991).
11 Barsh, supra note 34, at 231-34.
10 See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 201 (Revised) (1987).
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noncombatants are among those persons protected by the Geneva Ac-
cords.4' Civilized nation-states have a responsibility to honor and enforce
this treaty, which protects women from deprivation of basic needs and from
physical abuse during wartime. Only recently has physical abuse against
women in non-combat situations become part of the international law
dialogue.42 Additionally, specific instruments bar unequal treatment of
women by nation-states.43 While some instruments proscribe the abuse
of women through denial of political and social rights, these provisions are
directed only at the dominant nation-states. National power cannot be used
to burden or disable women who are members of an indigenous population.
International organizations utilize these international legal doctrines to
determine whether a country discriminates against its 'female population.
In two cases adjudicated by the U.N. Committee on Human Rights the
panel concluded that laws in Mauritius and Canada violated women's rights
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the
"Covenant" ).44
While Lovelace v. Canada5 demonstrates how international law has
protected indigenous women, a factually similar U.S. case, Santa Clara
"' 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, Part I, art. 3(1), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts
& Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989). Article 76 explicitly addresses the protection of women,
who shall be treated with "special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced
prostitution and any other form of indecent assault." Id. at art. 76(1).
42 At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June of 1993, a Global Tribunal
on Violations of Women's Human Rights heard the testimony of women on abuse directed toward
them in the family, national law, and wars. The Conference ended with a recognition that
women's rights are "an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights."
David B. Ottaway, Human Rights Post Suggested for U.N.; Conference Condemns Bosnian
'Cleansing,' WASH. POST, June 26, 1993, at A18. Subsequently the United Nations Human
Rights Commission appointed Radhika Coomarasamy to the post of special rapporteur to
investigate the violence against women. UNNames Investigatoron ViolenceAgainst Women, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 26, 1994, at C2; see Steven Greenhouse, State Dept. Finds Widespread Abuse of
World's Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1994, at Al.
43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(xxi), U.N. GAOR,
21st. Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966), [hereinafter International Covenant].
Article 3 prohibits inequality based on gender. Article 26 prohibits discrimination and inequality
on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. See generally NATALIE KAUFMAN HEVENER. INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1983) (providing collection and analysis of
international instruments).
I See Lovelace v. Canada, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex XVIII. at 166,
U.N. Doc. A4/36/40, reprinted in 2 HUM. RTS L. J. 158 (1981) [hereinafter Lovelace opinion];
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, GAOR Supp. (No. 40) (36th Session), Annex XIII, at 134,
U.N. Doc. A4/36/40, reprinted in 2 HUM. RTS L. J. 139 (1981).
1 Lovelace opinion, supra note 44.
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Pueblo v. Martinez,46 illustrates how the sovereignty doctrine47 distinc-
tively affects the treatment of American Indian women. Both cases
involved female tribal members who married non-members. 4' The
women's relationships with their tribes substantively changed as a result of
their marriages to non-members. Sandra Lovelace, for example, lost her
membership rights and benefits.49 In both cases, however, male members
who also married outside the tribe were not subject to the same disqualifi-
cations.5
These similar factual situations, however, did not produce the same
legal conclusions. In Lovelace, the U.N. Committee found gender
discrimination in the Canadian law based on the provisions in the
Covenant.5' Thereafter, the Canadian national government stated that it
would enact a statutory revision. 2
Martinez yielded a result opposite to Lovelace because of the different
law used in a federal forum. The Supreme Court determined that the Santa
Clara Pueblo, as a sovereign, was immune from suit and that protecting the
sovereignty of the tribe precluded the federal government from interfering
with the tribe's right to control qualifications for membership.53 Martinez
is based upon U.S. law and the federal policy affirming tribal sovereign-
ty54 as a legal doctrine. The Covenant provisions used in Lovelace
436 U.S. 49, 52 (1978).
4 See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n. 2 (1976) (explaining Indian Sovereignty
doctrine as policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control).
43 Martinez involved a Santa Clara Pueblo woman married to a non-member American Indian.
Lovelace centered on a Maliseet Indian woman whose spouse was a non-member.
49 Lovelace opinion, supra note 44, at para. 1. In Martinez, a female member of the Santa
Clara Pueblo challenged the constitutionality of a tribal ordinance that denied "tribal membership
to the children of female members who marry outside the tribe, but not to similarly situated
children of men of that tribe." Martinez, 436 U.S. at 49.
5 Lovelace opinion, supra note 44, at para. 1; Martinez, 436 U.S. at 49.
5' Lovelace opinion, supra note 44, at para. 17 (concluding that exclusion of Lovelace for
sole reason of marriage to non-Indian violates Article 27 of International Covenant).
52 See Bill C-31, An Act to Amend the Indian Act, R.S.C. ch. 32 (1st Supp. 1985) (Can.)
(revising Indian Act by removing gender-discriminating section).
11 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59, 72 (1978).
Tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which, by government structure, culture, and
source of sovereignty are in many ways foreign to the constitutional institutions of the
Federal and State Governments .... [Elfforts by the federal judiciary to apply the
statutory prohibitions of § 1302 in a civil context may substantially interfere with a
tribe's ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity.
Id. at 71-72.
Federal policy on Indian sovereignty has not been consistent. But see Ralph W. Johnson,
Fragile Gains, Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 643, 649 (1991) ("The study of Native American history teaches that the overriding, but
rarely articulated, policy of Canada and the United States towards Aboriginals was to get them
1995]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
probably could not apply in Martinez to obtain a decision favoring the
female plaintiff and her children; the U.S. tribes have not signed the
Covenant and are thus not bound by its provisions." Additionally, the
Covenant favors indigenous people in their autonomy. It states that, "[a]ll
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development." 56 It is not yet known where indigenous
women as a specific class may obtain enforceable rights in the emerging
picture in international law.
Indigenous women can seek the protection of their rights under
international provisions that protect all women against rights abuses by
nation-states.57 It is, however, doubtful whether these current instruments
protect indigenous women within their tribal governments. Where the
Covenant applies, as in Lovelace, indigenous women are not distinct from
all women with identifiable rights and potential remedies. The provisions
prohibit gender discrimination, abuse of women's personal security, and
loss of any rights or equality because the women are married.5
Convention 169 of the ILO also prohibits gender-based discrimina-
tion. 9 Yet, the ILO directs its force against nation-states with indigenous
peoples within their boundaries, not against indigenous peoples and their
governments. The ILO also provides that "the social, cultural, religious and
spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognized and
protected. "6 The ILO does not, however, indicate if or how the individu-
al rights of women are to be balanced against the interests of their
indigenous community.
In 1992, the Working Group on Indigenous Population6 released the
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People ["Draft Declara-
out of the way so their land could be settled and developed by whites."); Solem v. Bartlett, 465
U.S. 463,466-69 (1984) (acknowledging congressional policy to terminate reservation life, force
Indians to assimilate, and open Indian lands for non-Indian settlement).
The authors are unaware of any tribes that have ratified this instrument.
S6 International Covenant, supra note 43, at art. 1 (1). Other provisions of the article provide
that parties to the Covenant "shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination and
respect that right" of peoples. Id. at art. 1 (3).
11 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing Geneva Accords and International
Covenant).
5 International Covenant, supra note 43, at arts. 3, 9 (a), 23 (4), and 26.
9 ILO, supra note 37, at art. 3(l).
60 Id. at art. 5(a).
61 Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Tenth Session, U.N.
ESCOR, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 44th
Sess., Annex 1, at 44-52, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33 (1992) (commonly known as the
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People) [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
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tion"].62 While the Draft Declaration addressed "peoples" and their
rights, it failed to deliniate rights for individuals. 3 The 1993 revisions
to the Draft Declaration injected individual's rights into the provisions, yet
the document retained its collective focus.' Therefore, tribal power and
laws employed in Martinez may be valid under some provisions of the
Draft Declaration. While the Working Group grounded the Draft
Declaration's provisions in a communal perspective of rights, there is a
potential for conflict with law and instruments based on individualistic
principles of gender equality.' If gender equality becomes a fundamental
I See Sanders, supra note 35, at 406; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers
of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the
World, 4 DUKE L.J. 660, 676-704 (1990) [herinafter Williams, Frontiers] (providing history of
Working Group of Indigenous Population); Hurst Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous
Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 649, 657-62 (1987) (discussing development and mandate of Working
Group of Indigenous Population); see also Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams and Hard
Work: an Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 Wisc. L. REV. 411,446-47 (discussing task
of Working Group and potential impact of ILO).
I See Pommersheim, supra note 62, at 448 (citing Williams, Frontiers, supra note 62, at
684-85). The rights discussed in the Working Group's 1987 report can be separated into 4
groups: "(1) the distinctive nature of indigenous peoples' collective rights, (2) the centrality of
territorial rights to indigenous survival, (3) the recognition of indigenous peoples' right to self-
determining autonomy, and (4) international legal protection of indigenous rights." Id. These
categories remained applicable to the Working Group's 1992 report. The report focused upon the
collective rights of indigenous people and did not establish individuals' rights.
I U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/SUB.2/1993/29 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Draft Declaration]. The 1993 revisions added
new provisions and included indigenous individuals, along with indigenous peoples, to the class
to be protected. Part I. Article 2 provides that "[i]ndigenous individuals and peoples are free and
equal to all other individuals and peoples in dignity and right, and have the right to be free from
any kind of adverse discrimination, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity."
Id. at art. 2. Individual rights were injected into ten provisions: Part II, Articles 6. 7, 8, 9, 11
(a). (c), (d); Part IV. Article 18; and Part IX, Article 43. Id.
I See 1993 Draft Declaration, supra note 64, at art. 2 (revising some provisions from 1992
ILO, but retaining their substance to favor collective power). Article 33 of the 1993 ILO provides
"[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures
and their distinctive juridical customs, traditions, procedures and practices, in accordance with
internationally recognized human rights standards." Id. at art. 33. The Santa Clara Pueblo's rule
on membership is supported by other articles in the 1993 ILO. See id. at art. 32. Article 32
provides:
Indigenous peoples have the collective right to determine their own citizenship in
accordance with their customs and traditions. Indigenous citizenship does not impair
the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the states in which they live.
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structure and to select the
membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures.
Id.
The 1993 revisions in the ILO created the potential conflict more directly than the 1992
version. In both versions "[i]ndigenous peoples have the collective right to determine the respon-
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international norm, American Indian tribes could face challenges to their
customary legal practices.'
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women67 ("Women's Convention") created another potential
conflict between international legal doctrine and federal law. The
Women's Convention constructed its declaration on strict equality
principles, but failed to specifically address indigenous people and tribal
women. 68  This Convention could prohibit a ruling similar to Martinez
because the Convention's declaration provides that women shall have
"equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children.'69
Similarly, the Women's Convention declared that a woman who marries an
alien cannot lose her nationality, be forced to acquire her husband's
nationality, or be rendered stateless.7' Since the Women's Convention
does not specifically address indigenous peoples, it is conjectural to state
definitively that this equality doctrine conflicts with U.S. law.
American Indian nations with recognized sovereignty are a contrast to
other peoples who lack this source of jurisprudential power.71 Despite
sibilities of individuals to their communities." Compare Draft Declaration, supra note 61, at art.
19 with 1993 Draft Declaration, supra note 64, at art. 34. The 1993 version added a new
provision in Article 43: "[a]ll the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed
to male and female indigenous individuals." 1993 Draft Declaration, supra note 64, at art. 43.
1 The potential conflict may occur because Native American belief generally is collective and
communal in nature. Individualistic principals of gender equality will undoubtedly clash with the
Native American legal practice, the foundations of which are premised upon primacy and
centrality of the community as a whole. See generally Pommersheim, supra note 62, at 432-34
(discussing tribal court jurisprudence maintaining community); James W. Zion, Harmony Among
the People: Torts and Indian Courts, 45 MONT. L. REV. 265 (1984) [hereinafter Zion, Harmony]
("[t]he legal systems of Indian peoples were based upon the idea of maintaining harmony in the
family, the camp, and the community.").
7 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/830 (1979), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter Women's Convention]. The United States has not ratified this
Convention.
I Article 14, which requires state parties to take "all appropriate measures to ensure the
application of the provisions ... to women in rural areas" would probably allow the inclusion
of non-urban Indian women into the protected class. Id. at art. 14.
69 Id. at art. 9.
70 Id.
7' But see San Kronowitz, supra note 17, at 509. While the San Kronowitz comment
proposed that Native American tribal sovereignty existed implicitly in the Constitution and in the
early years of the United States, the sovereign status of Native American tribes has diminished.
Id. at 510. Despite the retention of the principle of tribal sovereignty in federal law, the tribes'
power and influence as sovereign states has been restricted as a result of federal policies and the
Supreme Court's effort to assimilate the people into the dominant culture. Id. at 622. See also
Pommersheim, supra note 62, at 413 (offering guidelines and suggestions to aid in both
"decolonizing federal Indian law and building on indigenous vision of tribal sovereignty").
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these contrasts, the tribes can provide some models of governance and the
use of custom for contemporary indigenous peoples.71 Tribal govern-
ments are implementing models through their laws, courts, and intervention
programs to protect their female members' 3 Martinez and the ongoing
work in tribal communities to protect women are congruous. Both types
of actions, defining membership and protecting members, are an exercise
of the tribal sovereign's power.' Moreover, the use of the tribal
sovereign's powers is bound to the cultural context of the American Indian
world.75 Both Martinez and the protective efforts of domestic violence
laws are the product of important tribal values.76 To understand the
Martinez decision and the tribal laws, one must consider the world view
which guides the indigenous people of the U.S.
II. INDIGENOUS NATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: A CULTURAL
VIEWPOINT
For each tribe of men Usen created He also made a home. In the
land for any particular tribe He placed whatever would be best for the
welfare of that tribe. When Usen created the Apaches He also gave them
their homes in the West. He gave them such grain, fruits, and game as
they needed to eat .... He gave them a pleasant climate and all they
needed for clothing and shelter was at hand. Thus it was in the
beginning: the Apaches and their homes each created for the other by
Usen himself. When they are taken from these homes they sicken and
die.
7- See Zion, Harmony, supra note 66, at 269-73 (1984) (discussing beneficial use of tribal
custom in Indian courts); see also Bill Donovan, Peacemakers Do Justice to Navajos; Alternative
Court Influences Behavior with Help of Family, ARiz. REPUB., Apr. 5, 1993, at Al (analyzing
operation and effectiveness of Navajo court's procedure of community involvement in dispute
resolution). But see Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 416-22 (noting highly disproportionate rate of
domestic violence, but attributing violence to disruption of traditional lifestyles and economies).
7 See infra notes 133-339 and accompanying text.
71 The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized an Indian nation's right to define its membership
in Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897). See COHEN 1982, supra note 19, at 20-23.
1 See Pommersheim, supra note 62, at 424-57 (identifying Native American language,
narrative, story, and justice as instruments to define and express Native American jurisprudence);
see also Zion, Harmony, supra note 66, at 275-76 (indicating many Native American tribes apply
own tribal customs and usages as civil law).
76 See, e.g., Chief Justice Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31
ARIz. L. REv. 225,227-34 (1989) (analyzing influence of Indian values and traditions on Navajo
peacemaker courts); Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 413-16 (tracing Navajo values embodied in
Navajo legal institutions).
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Geronimo. 7
And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and
multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over
the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living
thing that moveth upon the earth.
Genesis 1:28."s
A. A Shared Cultural Wewpoint
A commonality of values and perceptions exists among the many
indigenous peoples in the U.S., which contrasts starkly with the values and
views historically asserted by the majority culture in the United States.79
While this statement may generalize too broadly about both viewpoints, the
American Indians' shared viewpoint about both their reality and the
contrast is evident. A comparison of the two groups' viewpoints on
community, the individual, and conflict resolution reveals the difference
between the communal perspective of native peoples and the individual
rights focus of Euro-Americans. 8°
77 ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1984) [hereinafter
DEBO, HISTORY]. With the caveat that specific American Indians should be respected and
understood for their particular culture, Debo presented their commonly held views. In the
indigenous peoples' relationship with nature, they adapt and respectfully coexist with animals,
plants, and the land itself. Id. at 3-18. The "white man sought to dominate and change the natural
setting." Id. at 3.
79 Compare Genesis 1:28 (King James) (stating dominance-based view of Creation) with
DEBO, HISTORY, supra note 77, at 3 (quoting Geronimo's account of Creation which stresses
coexistence with nature). See generally RICHARD ERDOES & ALFONSO ORTIz, AMERICAN INDIAN
MYTHS AND LEGENDS (1984) (discussing other tribe's accounts of emergence and creation based
on coexistent relations rather than domination).
79 See Robin Paul Malloy, Letters From The Longhouse: Law, Economics and Native
American Values, 1992 WISc. L. REV. 1569 (1992) (containing letters written by members of six
native nations, including Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca and Tuscaroca). It is
suggested that these individual populations of several Indian authors project a similar concern for
Native American values which are in conflict with those of the dominant culture in the United
States. Id. at 1587-1620. But see id. at 1621 (noting that some values are consistent with
dominant culture). While the authors agree with Malloy that some Native American values "seem
consistent and compatible with the dominant capitalist economic structure," coincidence does not
reveal the underlying force for a cultural choice. Id. at 1621. We emphasize that the principle for
Native American values is communally based and frequently results in different approaches to the
enforcement of values. For instance, capitalism focuses on the individual engaged in rational self-
maximizing acquisition, ownership, and control of property. Individualistic capitalism is thus the
opposite of communally-held property requiring the responsibility of stewardship, whether the
tribal property (e.g., land) is used in communal ways or allocated for possessory use by an
individual, family or clan.
0 See infra notes 81 to 339 and accompanying text. Moreover, the difference between the
values of the dominant cultures and those of Native Americans has been a historical constant and
the justification for policies destructive of tribal life. Consider the statement of Senator Henry
[Vol. 69:69
TRIBAL PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN
The political philosophy of John Locke, influential in the formation of
the United States government, presents communities as the basic political
entity protecting individual rights." The drafters of the Constitution did
not seek the participation of the Indian nations in the "mutuality of
concession" that created the U.S. Constitution, the social contract that
guides the majority culture in the United States.' The preclusion of the
Dawes who sponsored the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-342, 348, 349, 381 (1994)). The Act explicitly sought to
undercut the political and cultural identity of Indian nations by destroying their common
ownership of land. Dawes, however, saw this system as flawed and in need of improvement:
The head chief told us that there was not a family in that whole nation that had not a
home of its own. There was not a pauper in that nation, and the nation did not owe a
dollar. It built its own capitol, in which we had this examination, and it built its
schools and its hospitals. Yet the defect of the system was apparent. They have got as
far as they can go, because they own their land in common. It is Henry George's
system, and under that there is no enterprise to make your home any better than that
of you neighbors. There is no selfishness, which is at the bottom of civilization. Till
this people will consent to give up their lands, and divide them among their citizens
so that each can own the land he cultivates, they will not make much more progress.
ANGELA DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN 21-22 (1966) (quoting BOARD OF INDIAN
COMMISSIONERS, ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. Doe. No. 104, 49th Cong., 1 Sess. 90-91 (1885),
microformed in CIS Vol. 30, Fiche 2398.). Dawes made his observation after the forced removal
of the Cherokees from Georgia to Oklahoma. In Oklahoma, the Cherokees' success in rebuilding
society on foreign soil failed to protect them from (or caused them to become subject to) the
Allotment Acts. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding constitutionality
of Allotment Act). Allotment was only one component of federal Indian policy which imposed
an individual rights model of society upon tribal peoples. See DEBO, HISTORY, supra note 77.
at 316-31 (describing impact of government regulations promulgated after Allotment acts).
81 JOHN LOCKE. Two TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed. 1960): see GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 282-305 (1969) (discussing
Locke's influence on American legal thought during early years of American Republic). Compare
Robert W. Venables, American Indian Influences on the America of the Founding Fathers, in
EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 73 (John C. Mohawk & Oren R. Lyons eds., 1992) [hereinafter EXILED IN THE
LAND OF THE FREE] (surveying European and Native American cultural and philosophical
influences on Founding Fathers of U.S. Constitution) with JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 207 (1990) (discussing
"[d]istorted [l]ens of [p]roperty" affecting formation of constitutional principles which attempted
to reconcile property rights, personal rights, and republican theory of government contingent on
consent of individuals).
However one treats Lockian and republican principles in federal constitutionalism, both
philosophies emphasize individual rights. The communal perspective of indigenous people, as dis-
cussed in this section, is inadequately addressed by these Western philosophies.
I Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 780-81 (1991). But see Venables,
supra note 81, at 113 (1992) (discussing treaty between Confederation Congress and Delaware
Indians in which parties offered to "work mutually toward the concept of an American Indian
state joining the United States").
While not participants in the constitutional drafting and the predecessor Articles of the
Confederation, various sources point to the Five Nations or Iroquois Confederacy, the
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indigenous nations from the Constitutional Convention is not the sole
explanation for the difference between indigenous and Euro-American
cultures.' Both cultures value the maintenance of community through law
or customary rules of conduct, but this facial resemblance between the two
societies cannot mask the differences.
In establishing the function of law derived from distinct values,
indigenous people and the dominant U.S. culture do differ. Native
American tribes subscribe to communal values as the guiding principle for
the laws that govern an individual's conduct.' This preference does not
mean that individual interests are ignored. Native American laws strive to
protect individuals, at the same time preserving the cultural beliefs and
practices of the collective framework. 5 Thus, tribal societies are built on
community or relational foundations.86 The relational foundation does not
mean that individual rights are inconsistent with tribal interests. The key
questions are: 1) which rights and values ought to exist; and 2) how can
designated rights be held by an abstract individual, independent of social
context, relationships with others or historical setting?'
For tribal people, the real-life relational framework is the key to how
individuals should treat each other.88 The Navajo Nation Peacemaker
Court materials represent one example of this framework.89 The materials
state as the operating principles for those before that traditional body:
"K'ei is kinship which arranges correct conduct of the individuals within
a family unit. . . . Doonee is the clan group where rules of correct
Haudenosaunee, as an inspirational model for the colonists designing a new nation. See Venables,
supra note 81, at 13-124.
3 See, e.g., Williams, Jr., Medieval and Renaissance Origins, supra note 19 (examining
development and origins of Western legal thought on nature and extent of Indian tribal
sovereignty and rights). Western thought is of "individualistic orientation." Id. at 4. "Through
this exploitive process, white governments hoped to transform the Indian through contact with
European materialistic and individualistic value structures and to inculcate him with those values."
Id. at 5.
1 See Richard Heiz, Note, Legal Protection for Indigenous Cultures: Sacred Sites and
Communal Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 691, 699 (noting Native American perspective of social beings
born into network of group relations).
I See Zion, Harmony, supra note 66, at 269-73 (tracing Navajo values embodied in their
legal institutions); see also Donovan, supra note 72, at Al (discussing role of traditional cultural
values in Navajo peacemaker courts).
I Pommersheim, supra note 62, at 435-41 (building on MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFEERENCE 149-52, 311, 382-83 (1990) in context of where relational structures guide proper
treatment of individuals).
i Id. at 149-52.
s See Zion, Harmony, supra note 66, at 269-72.
8 The Navajo Nation Peacemaker Court: An Introduction 1 (July 7, 1992) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the St. John's Law Review).
[Vol. 69:69
19951 TRIBAL PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN
conduct, with fellow clan groups of the same tribe, are foremost....
Bahoddaatah is the innate nature and responsibility of an individual['s]
existence." 9' These concepts anchor the standards of respect and
responsibility which the Peacemaker court employs to review members'
conduct when conflicts must be resolved. Conflict among individuals is a
universal feature of human society." The survival of an organized
community depends on the resolution of the inevitable conflicts between the
interests of individual members and the interests of the community as a
whole. 2
The resolution of conflicts and the maintenance of a universal harmony
is a primary concern for indigenous nations and their members, but the
cultural guide utilized is distinct from that of predominantly Western
societies.9" Individual interests are considered as part of a larger perspec-
tive. The individual and the community are part of the kinship that exists
among all life forms and the environmental elements. Harmony is the
desired result of the relationship with all life forms, including humans,
animals, and plants.'
For tribal people, conflict arises when the individual is out of balance
or in disharmony with other community members and elements in the
universe.9' Restoration of the individual's physical and mental well-being
requires the involvement of others in understanding the problem and its
9 Id. at 1-2.
91 See KATHERINE NEWMAN, LAW AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF PREINDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 1-49 (1983) (surveying and summarizing theories of legal
evolution).
' See Zion, Harmony, supra note 66, at 272-73 (offering three examples of traditional legal
principles that stress importance of community involvement in dispute resolution).
I Tso, supra note 76 at 233 (highlighting emphasis that Navajo courts place on people's
traditional relationship with nature). The Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
stated:
We refer to the earth and sky as Mother Earth and Father Sky. These are not catchy
titles; they represent our understanding of our place. The earth and sky are our
relatives. Nature communicates with us through the wind and the water and the
whispering pines. Our traditional prayers include prayers for the plants, the animals.
the water and the trees. A Navajo prayer is like a plant. The stem or the backbone of
the prayer is always beauty. By this beauty we mean harmony. Beauty brings peace
and understanding. It brings youngsters who are mentally and physically healthy and
it brings long life. Beauty is people living peacefully with each other and with nature.
Id.; see also Zion, Harmony, supra note 66 (providing introduction to value of harmony in legal
systems of Indian people).
0 DEBO, HISTORY, supra note 77, at 3; see also Malloy, supra note 79 at 1623 (stating that
Indians "appear to see themselves as connected directly to the earth, plants and animals of their
life cycle.").
9 See Tso, supra note 76, at 233-34 (describing critical role played by nature and community
in Navajo judicial system).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:69
resolution.96 Traditional forms of problem resolution include non-
adversarial forums where respected elders, family, and clan members
contribute to the outcome. 9 When the resolution occurs, the individual
and the community can resume a life that promotes harmonious relation-
ships.98 Accommodation and compromise, not win-or-lose strategies,
contribute to the desired traditional outcome. 99 This type of accommoda-
tion and compromise of individual interests may not be understood or
appreciated by persons outside the tribe.'t° Internal decisionmaking and
the resolution of intra-tribal conflicts have traditionally not included
outsiders, including non-member Indians.' 0 '
B. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez and Divergent Cultures
A non-Indian's lack of appreciation for tribal autonomy and its
importance in Native American communities is reflected in the articles
' Id. at 231. Tso provides an example of community involvement in conflict resolution:
What holds us together is a strong set of values and customs, not words on paper. I
am speaking of a sense of community so strong that, before the federal government
imposed its system on us, we had no need to lock up wrongdoers. If a person injured
another or disrupted the peace of the community, he was talked to, and often
ceremonies were performed to restore him to harmony with his world.
Id.
I Id. (describing this community involvement as Navajo "talking" session, the effects of
which did not create repeat offenders); see also Donovan, supra note 72, at Al (stating that prior
to imposition of American law, "the Navajos had a very successful system that allowed people
in the family and in the community to get involved and try to work out a solution that was
acceptable to everyone").
I Michael Taylor, Modem Practice in the Indian Courts, 10 UNIV. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
231 (1987). Taylor contends that:
[i]n order to effectively represent an individual plaintiff with a claim for violation of
civil rights against a tribal agency or official in an Indian court, a non-Indian lawyer
must learn about the tribal culture, customs, and law that are the basis of the tribal
concept of civil rights. This is especially important when the client is an Indian. The
Indian client usually wants to remain an effective and respected part of the reservation
society, whether his lawsuit is won or lost, and this result may be compromised if the
goal of the lawsuit is not somewhat consistent with the tribal understanding of personal
rights.
Id. at 255-56; see also NEWMAN, supra note 91, at 47 (noting that "[tihe ultimate goal of dispute
settlement is to return social relationships to their normal state").
' See Taylor, supra note 98, at 255-56.
100 See generally id. at 231 (intending to provide reader with basic understanding of Indian
court jurisdiction and practice). Generally a tribally-identified Indian client will shy away from
a win at all costs strategy to prevent any rejection by the tribe.
"' The exclusion of nonmembers in the resolution of intratribal conflicts emphasizes the role
of the community in Indian judicial systems. See Donovan, supra note 72, at Al. The modem
Navajo peacemaker courts "make every effort to get as many of a person's relatives and friends
to show up as possible." Id.
1995] TRIBAL PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN
written about Martinez. Martinez disturbed many non-Indians, especially
feminists, because the Court's holding denied full tribal membership to
children of a female tribal member who married outside of the tribe.
102
Some commentators made an equal protection argument, which would have
the effect of treating a tribe-specific rule as common to all Native American
tribal nations. 13 Responses such as this overlook the unique status of
"I See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Court,
56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 725 (1989) (expressing apprehension over "ease with which the
Supreme Court in Martinez assumed the 1939 Ordinance to be an artifact of Santa Clara
sovereignty."); see also CATHERINE MACKINNON, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v.
Santa Clara Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 63 (1987) (asserting that tribal rule in Martinez
case is result of male supremacy). But see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 593 (1990) (criticizing Professor MacKinnon's analysis
of Martinez.). Professor Harris deemed MacKinnon's analysis "ultimately crippled" because she
reached her conclusion without attempting a more thorough analysis of the history and importance
of the ordinance. Id. at 594.
Whatever the reasons for the 1939 ordinance, it is not an "artifact" but a conscious twentieth
century choice by a tribal community, an affirmative decision within the pueblo's sovereign
power. Critics of Martinez argue about the authenticity of the 1939 ordinance based on some
historical set point such as pre-contact values. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra, at 66-7. Whether
contact with Europeans injected patriarchal values into some tribes' social structure is certainly
arguable. What is not arguable is that twentieth century tribal nations can use their sovereign's
power to change laws about membership, wisely and unwisely, just as modem European nations
like Switzerland and Germany have recently restricted who can obtain membership in their
nations. See, e.g., Carla Christofferson, Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect Native American
Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil RightsAct, 101 YALE L. J. 169. 179-84(1991) (pro-
posing amendment to ICRA giving all Native American women equal protection within tribal
lands, analogous to that enjoyed by all American citizens); see also John Marks, A German's Lot
is Still an Exclusive One, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 24, 1995, at 48 (discussing
German citizenship requirements).
Non-Indian feminists' views should be compared with those of Indian feminists. Compare
Reyna Green, Native American Woman, SIGNS 248 (Winter 1980) [hereinafter Green, Native
American Woman] (Cherokee Indian contending Indian feminist writing bears very little
resemblance to non-Indian feminist analysis) and PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED Hoop:
RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN AMERICAN INDIAN TRADITION (1986) (Laguna Pueb-
lo/Sioux/Lebanese discussing matriarchical Indian society) with Teresa D. LaFramboise &
Anneliese M. Heyle, Changing and Diverse Role of Women in American Indian Cultures, 22 SEX
ROLES 455 (discussing role of women in Indian society). See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding the Legacy of White Patriarchy in an American
Indian Cultural Context, 24 GA. L. REV. 1019 (1990) [hereinafter Williams, Jr., Gendered
Checks] (asserting that legacy of white patriarchy encumbers ability of non-Indians to comprehend
distinctive aspects of Indian culture).
103 See, e.g., Christofferson, supra note 102, at 170. ("[The Santa Clara ruling has left
Native American women virtually paralyzed within a system that subordinates women."). While
it is possible that Christofferson directed this comment only at Santa Clara Pueblo, she proposes
a broad general remedy that would control all tribes. Id. at 183. Christofferson proposes that the
Indian Civil Rights Act be expanded to prohibit discrimination based on gender, waive tribal
sovereign immunity, and insure federal court review after exhaustion in tribal courts. Id. at 183-
84.
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American Indian tribes as sovereigns outside the usual realm of American
constitutional law.I°4  As a result, commentators ignore the repeated
affirmations that issues in Indian law require a non-constitutional analy-
sis.105 These non-Indian and feminist views overlook the premise that
only the essential quality of a particular tribe's sovereignty can explain
outcomes similar to and different from Martinez."
The tribe's power to self-define by establishing the qualifications for
membership is key to sovereignty and to understanding Martinez."°  It
is not clear, for instance, how critics of Martinez respond to the Navajo
Nation's custom that empowers a matrilineal and matrilocal society, so as
" See Vine Deloria, Jr., The Application of the Constitution to American Indians, in EXILED
IN THE LAND OF THE FREE, supra note 81, at 281 (analyzing how powers authorized in
Constitution have been applied to Indians and conflicts among state and federal governments and
Indian sovereignty); see also Laurence M. Hauptman, Congress, Plenary Power, and the
American Indian, 1870 to 1992, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE, supra note 81, at 317
(asserting that doctrine of plenary power and present federal-Indian relationship must be altered
from paternalism and interventionism to self-government).
105 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (holding that employment preference
for qualified Indians in Bureau of Indian Affairs provided by Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
did not violate non-Indian employees' due process rights because it is rationally related to
fulfillment of Congress' "unique obligation toward the Indians"). The Court noted additional
decisions upholding legislation that singled out Indians for particular and special treatment. Id.
(citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943) (federally granted tax immunity)
and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations)).
106 See Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks, supra note 102, at 1023 n. 9. Williams, a Lumbee
Indian, had this reaction to the criticisms of Martinez:
My own opinion is that the efforts and debates among non-Indian feminists about how
Martinez ought to be understood underscore the need to come to grips with sexism and
prejudice in traditional Indian communities in terms that have meaning for the individ-
uals who comprise those communities. As Gretchen Bataille and Kathleen Muller Sands
have warned, the scholarly literature about American Indian women accepting the view
that Indian women are inferior in their cultures is based on research which "ignored
the power of women within tribal structures or undervalued or inadequately valued it."
Id. (citing G. BATAILLE & K.M. SANDS, AMERICAN INDIAN WOMEN, TELLING THEIR LIvES VIII
(1984)); see also Clara Sue Kidwell, The Power of Women in Three American Indian Societies.
6 J. ETHNIC STUD. 113, 120 (1978) (pointing out that Indian woman "is still a bearer of culture
and identity of her people, and in this role there is still power").
Cf. Beatrice Medicine, North American Indigenous Women and Cultural Domination, 17
AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 121 (1993) (discussing the gender inequality resulting from
"administered relationships" of patriarchy imposed on traditional cultures by the federal
government and some negative effects from the Martinez decision). The retained cultural values
that provide vitality to contemporary tribes is discussed: "Fortunately, the political and economic
influence of women has grown since the 1960s. Women of the Northern Plains, in particular,
have maintained a power base and prestige structure that is tied to artistic efforts, the
manipulation of educational avenues, and welfare and economic enterprises, and ritual
participation." Id. at 129.
1 7 See Resnik, supra note 102, at 719-20 (discussing importance of membership in Santa
Clara Pueblo).
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to define important legal rights by the mother's clan.' In the Onondaga
Nation, tribal males, whose rights and status are subject to the Onondaga
Faithkeepers' authority, can neither vote for these leaders nor have non-
member spouses reside on tribal land. 1' 9 The Faithkeepers are selected
and appointed by, and are accountable to, the Clan Mother."0 A broad
brush approach demanding equality for women and men in all tribal
situations would trample upon both the power of the tribal sovereigns and
the values used to construct their governments."'
Indian feminists have rejected the Western feminist approach to gender
equality by retaining the cultural framework and a commitment to the tribal
nations' autonomy." 2 Rayna Green, a Cherokee, states:
For Indian feminists, every women's issue is framed in the larger
context of Native American people. The concerns which characterize
debate in Indian country, tribal sovereignty and self-determination, for
example, put Native American tribes on a collision path with regulations
like Title 9 and with Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action. Tribes
insist that treaty-based sovereignty supersedes any other federal mandate.
While many Native American women have personal difficulty with the
application of tribal sovereignty to affirmative action in tribal hiring, for
" See Navajo Nation v. Murphy, 15 INDIAN L. RPrR. 6035 (Navajo Nation Supreme Court,
1988) (rejecting one foundation of marital privilege rule of evidence from Anglo-American law,
that women have no independent legal status, because of Navajo's matrilineal society).
11 See Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks, supra note 102, at 1039 (noting Iroquois, including
Onondaga, for whom "the transmission of all titles, rights and property descended through the
female clan line to the exclusion of the male."); see also Winds of Change-A Matter of Promises
(PBS television broadcast, 1990) (discussing Onondaga's recent decision to exclude non-member
spouses of male members from tribal lands).
1o Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks, supra note 102, at 1036-44.
See Christofferson, supra note 102 at 179-85; MACKINNON, supra note 102, at 68 ("I
want to suggest that cultural survival is as contingent upon equality between women and men as
it is upon equality among peoples."); Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks, supra note 102, at 1037.
Williams also acknowledges:
There are, of course, many Indian tribes and communities, and therefore many
different Indian cultural contexts. Gender roles differ radically among various Indian
tribes.. . . Such variability across the broad spectrum of traditional and contemporary
American Indian cultural patterns makes any effort at generalizations about the
positions of women in Indian societies difficult, if not impossible, to sustain beyond
just a few instances.
Id. at 1037.
"2 See Green, Native American Women, supra note 102, at 248. A Cherokee feminist, Green
contended that Indian feminist writing bears very little resemblance to non-Indian feminist analysis
of women's lives. See id. at 264; see also RAYNA GREEN, NATIVE AMERICAN WOMEN: A
CONTEXTUAL BIBLIOGRAPHY (1983) [hereinafter GREEN, BIBLIOGRAPHY] (reviewing material on
Native North American women from late seventeenth century). Medicine, supra note 106, at 124
("At the present time, there are many instances of legal inequities in the lives of Indians, both
male and female.").
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example, most agree that sovereignty is best debated without special
exception. "'
This statement, acknowledging that contemporary Indian women experience
personal difficulties, is not that of an atypical Indian feminist." 4 Rayna
Green notes, however, that conservation and innovation continue to exist
in tribal societies because Indian women insist on taking their traditional
places as healers, legal specialists and tribal government leaders."15  The
return to tradition, retraditionalization, coupled with the evolution of
gender roles in American Indian society continue the complementary and
mutual roles enjoyed by women and men." 6
W, Green, Native American Woman, supra note 102, at 248, 264.
"I Id. at 264-65. We present a view different from feminists such as MacKinnon, but not
because we reject the worth of equality principles. Rather, as women of ethnic identity, we know
well that our admission into the law professoriate, notwithstanding our qualifications, was
propelled in part by the equality movements and affirmative action. The development of multiple
ways of seeing and knowing the world and the construction of jurisprudence that acknowledges
the truth of various perspectives is critical in our view. See Martha Minow, Feminist Reason:
Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 51 (1988) ("[W]hy, when it comes to our own
arguments and activities, do feminists forget the very insights that animate feminist initiatives,
insights about the power of unstated reference points and points of view, the privileged position
of the status quo, and the pretense that a particular is the universal?"). See generally Harris,
supra note 102, at 588 (rejecting gender essentialism, theory of "monolithic 'women's experience'
that can be described as independent of other facets of experience like race, class and sexual
orientation. . ."); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness As
Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 297, 300 (1992). Matsuda states, "[i]n
arguing for multiple consciousness as jurisprudential method, I don't mean to swoop up and
thereby diminish the power of many different outsider traditions. Our various experiences are
not co-extensive." Id. We believe that the unique status of American Indian women as members
of sovereign tribal nations cannot be separated completely from their experiences, positive and
negative, as females. Further, issues affecting tribal women cannot be analyzed in isolation from
the extraconstitutional doctrines of tribal sovereignty.
"I Green, NativeAmerican Woman, supra note 102, at 264-65 (listing female political leaders
who have emerged from tribes); see also Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks, supra note 102, at
1034-35 n. 21 (discussing meaningful forms of power exercised by women in their significant
roles as executives of tribes and as legislators). Of the twenty reservations in Arizona in 1989.
six were led by women holding the position of tribal chairperson. Id. To have a comparable
amount of power in U.S. politics, non-Indian women would have to gain fifteen of the fifty
governorships. Id.
"6 [F]or many Indian women, positions of authority and prominence are natural
evolutions of their caretaking role and they see their actions as personal rather than
organizational.. . . It is important to recognize that retraditionalization efforts on the
part of Indian women are often inconsistent with some goals of the current majority-
culture women's movement. Non-Indian feminists emphasize middle-class themes of
independence and androgyny whereas Indian women often see their work in the context
of their families, their nations, and Sacred Mother Earth. Preservation and restoration
of their race and culture is at least as important to Indian women as are their individual
goals for professional achievement and success, although many Indian women clearly
have made important professional commitments and value the role of work in their
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Complementary roles arise from the deepest traditional beliefs tribal
people hold about how they were created and should function in the
universe. One Indian feminist, Paula Gunn Allen, echoes a pervasive
understanding "that primary power-the power to make and to re-
late-belongs to the preponderantly feminine powers of the universe."117
The strictly drawn gender lines of the majority culture fail to explain much
in indigenous belief systems where the creative force is exclusively
feminine."' Although this spirit or creative force can change forms
(including manifesting itself as a male if necessary), the maintenance of a
complementary social structure remains essential if a tribe is to deal
effectively with internal and external matters.119 In the complementary
relational system of the tribe, membership in the tribe and who can
undertake roles are key concerns."Z
lives.
LaFromboise & Heyle, supra note 102, at 470-71 (citations omitted).
"' ALLEN, supra note 102, at 17. "Traditional tribal lifestyles are more often gynocratic than
not, and they are never patriarchal. These features make understanding tribal cultures essential
to all responsible activists who seek life-affirming social change . . . ." Id. at 2.
118 See id. at 13-16 (maintaining that quintessential spirit made earth, creatures, plants, and
light, and that central to all is woman without whose blessing nothing is sacred). Thought
Woman, Spider Woman, Corn Woman, Earth Woman and White Buffalo Woman are spirits said
to possess this creative force.
119 Id. at 18-20; see Linda J. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family
in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 325 (1987). Under the federal assimilation policies of
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the conversion of the Indians to be was of utmost
importance if Indian families were to resemble white families. Such was the goal of the
assimilation policies. Religious groups, notably the evangelical Protestants, had a sharp influence
over these policies. They sought to reconstruct the American Indian family to comport with the
gender restrictions of majority society, as well as to force the adoption of the concepts of
individualism and property ownership. Id. Lacey describes some American Indian family
practices, primarily those of Plains Indians, which shocked the white missionaries. For instance,
tribal women did more strenuous physical labor than white women of the upper-class; some tribes
allowed women to accompany men on hunting parties; and Indian women played a central role
in religious ceremonies. Id. at 335.
110 Outsiders historically misinterpreted the role of indigenous women, often because of
ignorance or misplaced interests of the external society. See Rayna Green, The Pocahontas
Perplex: The Image of Indian Women in American Culture, 16 MASS. REV. 698 (1975). The
Pocahontas Perplex suggests that "Indian women have to be exotic, wild, collaborationist, crazy,
or white to qualify for 'white' attention." Green, Native American Women. supra note 102, at
257. Green's historical review of these misconceptions is demonstrated in Medicine's account of
how ethnographers interpreted the White Buffalo Calf Women as a way to validate the
subjugation of women. See Beatrice Medicine, Indian Women: Tribal Identiiy As Status Quo, in
WOMAN'S NATURE: RATIONALIZATIONS OF INEQUALITY 63 (Marian Lowe & Ruth Hubbard eds.,
1983). Medicine contrasts one ethnographer's Oedipean analysis of White Buffalo Calf Women
with the analysis of two traditional male Lakota religious leaders, who explain that this feminine
creative power keeps the tribe alive and is part of the complementary roles of men and women.
Id. at 66-68.
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The tribal nation's ability to define membership, its qualifications,
benefits and responsibilities is explicitly connected to the customary values
of a tribe. The tribes face enormous challenges in melding traditional
values with the demands of operating a contemporary government
responsive to members' needs. Tribes manage this task by relying on a
historically successful approach: they conserve and innovate. Through a
combination of conservation and innovation in their customs and practices,
the indigenous peoples of the Americas survived the injection of European
populations, life forms, and ideas into their lives.'2' Consequently, it is
foolhardy to think that American Indians can be unchangingly defined by
a historically set point. Such a view treats American Indians as living
artifacts and ignores their ability to develop by reinterpreting custom. The
reinterpretation of traditional beliefs and behavior has led numerous tribes
to select women as the tribal nation's chief official." In sharp contrast,
the United States has yet to entrust the Presidency to a woman. It is not
surprising that tribes have acted to share leadership roles with women."
" See generally Peter Iverson, Native People and Native Histories, in OXFORD HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN WEST 9 (Clyde A. Milner II, et al. eds., 1994) (discussing development of
American Indian West); Valencia-Weber, supra note 30, at 225 (discussing development of
American Indian law derived from custom among nations); Peter Iverson, Taking Care of the
Earth and Sky, in AMERICA: 1492: THE WORLD OF INDIAN PEOPLE BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF
COLUMBUS 85 passim (Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. ed., 1992) [hereinafter AMERICA 1492] (discussing
conservation and innovative practices of American indigenous people); Clara Sue Kidwell,
Systems of Knowledge, in AMERICA 1492, supra, at 372 (discussing differences between Native
American and European usage of observations). The transformation of native cultures because
they accepted the horse demonstrates the interplay between conservation and innovation. See
generally LA VERNE HARRELL CLARK, THEY SANG FOR HORSES: THE IMPACT OF THE HORSE
ON NAVAJO AND APACHE FOLKLORE (1966) (examining impact of horse upon traditional forms
of Navajo and Apache folklore during more than three hundred years of influence); JOHN C.
EWERS, THE HORSE IN BLACKFOOT INDIAN CULTURE 374 (1955); Margot Liberty, Hell Came
With Horses: Plains Indian Women in the Equestrian Era, WESTERN HIST., Summer, 1982 11-
19. (1982) (describing Plains Indian women's role in traditional matrilineal societies and how
horses permitted some women to participate in warfare).
'2 See, e.g., WILMA MANKILLER & MICHAEL WALLIS, MANKILLER: A CHIEF AND HER
PEOPLE (1993). Mankiller recently completed multiple terms as the Principal Chief of the
Cherokees. Her occupation of this role is not unique in light of the fact that numerous tribes
have, through tradition and evolution, entrusted women to lead their nation. These women include
Ada Deer of the Menominees (Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior),
Juanita Learned of the Cheyenne-Arapahoe, and Verna Olguin Teller of Isleta Pueblo. See also,
ALLEN, supra note 102, at 31, (citing 1981 report that sixty-seven American Indian women were
heads of state).
'3 See, e.g., Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 412 (discussing women's equality, the Navajo
culture and women's ownership of land); Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks, supra note 102, at
1039 (commenting on women's power and property rights).
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Tribes in the nineteenth century ensured women their own property
rights. 124 This was long before the state or federal governments allowed
women to own property or treated women as legal or political actors.'
The contents of tribal domestic abuse codes appear to be grounded in
the traditional willingness of tribes to respect women in complementary
roles which promote tribal well-being. The protection of the physical
security of female tribal members is considered critical for two reasons:
it maintains continuity with customary values, and it meets the duties of a
government to promote the well-being of all members.
Despite problems associated with poverty, unemployment, alcoholism,
and inadequate education, contemporary tribes strive to return to their
traditional values and beliefs. A failure to do so can only lead to increased
problems, as abused individuals treat others in an abusive manner.'26 For
instance, abuse of female tribal members frequently results in abuse to
children, and eventually spreads throughout the tribal community.'27
Resolution, remediation, and prevention must reach beyond the individual
female victims and incorporate offenders into the process. Additionally,
any steps taken should preserve cultural values which honor families and
clans in relational networks. Effective tribal law and intervention results
in the protection of individuals and the restoration of offenders to
community participation. Both outcomes are needed to strengthen a
community.
In essence, tribes should strive to protect their female members
through a system which preserves the cultural values of the tribe.'1
'2 See ANGIE DEBO, THE ROAD TO DISAPPEARANCE 124-25, 305-08 (1984); see also ANGIE
DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 300 (1970) (describing Indian
resistance to Allotment Act scheme of allocating land to male "head of family" as alien concept
in their cultural systems where women and children had property rights).
'2 See NORMAN A. GRAEBNER ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 458 (1975).
As late as the early nineteenth century, women had no legal control over property and could not
vote. Id. LOUIS B. WRIGHT ET AL., THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE (REVISED), A SHORT
AMERICAN HISTORY 230 (1968) (noting that American women in the mid-nineteenth century did
not enjoy full rights to own property, be educated, or enter many occupations).
"26 See, e.g., Navajo Nation Domestic Abuse Protection Act NAVAJO TRIB. CODE, tit. 9,
§ 1602 (1993) (stating that domestic abuse has long-term effects on abused individuals, entire
family and clan, and Navajo Nation as whole).
IV Id.
I' It is the policy of the Navajo Nation to demonstrate respect for members of the
Navajo family and clan. . . . Abuse against persons in a domestic setting has a lasting
and detrimental effect on (I) the individuals who directly experience the abuse, (2) the
entire family and clan, as members indirectly experience the abuse, and (3) the Navajo
Nation, as the victims and abusers carry the adverse effects of domestic abuse out of
the family and into society itself.
Id.; see also Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 425-26.
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Without culturally appropriate means to lessen the social disruption, tribal
societies risk losing their identity as distinct cultures and sovereigns. A
commitment to traditional relational values, such as those which stress
family and clan honor, should help to alleviate problems associated with the
physical and psychological abuse of female tribal members. A review of
some protective models from American Indian tribes demonstrates that
tribes are engaged in an earnest effort to preserve their tribal uniqueness
through codes, court orders, and interventions which stress the protection
of women. 29
III. CUSTOM AND TRIBAL CODES, ORDERS, AND PROGRAMS TO
PROTECT WOMEN
In prereservation society, beliefs... were handed down by all the people
to the coming generations. In order for a tiyospaye to live in unity and
cooperation, it was necessary for all to live according to the same
beliefs/laws/values. This resulted in unity. When people living together
do not share the same beliefs/laws/values, there will be confusion.
Individuals will not have a foundation from which to guide their self-
conduct. Individuals will live according to different values, and the
society made up of those individuals will exist in confusion as to what is
considered proper behavior."o
A. Scope of Review 3'
This portion of the article will focus on contemporary tribal activities,
tribal laws, the common law of tribal courts, and tribal intervention
programs in operation. This approach is distinguishable from anthropologi-
cal studies, in which information is gathered by interviewing members of
a society about their perceptions3 2 or reliance on Human Relations Area
Files (reports compiled by anthropologists detailing their observations and
,29 See infra notes 138-339 (discussing codes of Indian tribes).
'3 Plume, supra note 2, at 71.
'3, The computerized databases WESTLAW and LEXIS do not incorporate tribal court
decisions and do not create specialized databases for tribal law. The Indian Law Reporter is
published by the American Indian Lawyer Training Program. Much of the information used for
this section of the article was obtained directly from tribal people. Tribal codes, court opinions,
orders, and intervention programs are not available through standard legal reporting systems.
The Indian Law Reporter serves in a limited way to publish some tribal court opinions.
132 See generally RUTH M. UNDERHILL, PAPAGO WOMAN 48 (Barbara A. Babcock ed.,
1979); PUEBLO MOTHERS AND CHILDREN: ESSAYS BY ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS 1915-1924
(Barbara A. Babcock ed., 1991).
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interpretations of the societies studied).' We have reservations about
how salient some of these studies are to contemporary tribal people in the
United States. I34 Practices reported in some studies do not comport with
what we have observed in contemporary tribal societies. Consequently,
this article offers a review which is an emerging picture of how tribes
protect their female members.
This review presents a discussion of the legal treatment of domestic
violence by fourteen United States tribes. 135 It is not intended to be a
description of the state of the law among all 537 tribes. Rather, this article
is a general survey of existing tribal law on domestic violence., The
selected tribal laws were not chosen to represent the way that all tribes
should approach domestic violence. Instead, they serve as a starting point
from which to analyze the issues that arise when tribal communities
confront issues of domestic violence. The laws demonstrate the effort of
tribes to ensure the physical security of women within their respective
jurisdictions.
Of the tribes examined, almost all have specific laws which address
domestic violence. 136  Many of these tribal codes have common provi-
sions. The most frequently recurring provisions are those defining
' See DAVID LEVINSON, FAMILY VIOLENCE IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (Frontiers
of Anthropology series, No. 1, 1989).
,34 Id. at 34 (citing Arapaho practice of husband punishing suspected adulterous wife by
cutting off tip of her nose or slashing her cheeks). While historically some tribes used mutilation
to mark those who had broken tribal customs, such punishments are not contemporary practices.
Id. Although such practices are no longer prevalent, Levinson points out that the attitudes towards
them are still mixed. Additionally, the theoretical frameworks examining these practices remain
useful to illustrate the repercussions of violent behavior. Id. The issue of cultural bias or
misinterpretation concerns us, but that is beyond the purview of this article. See supra note 111
(discussing outsider misinterpretation of native women's status and roles). See generally Glenda
Riley, Some European (Mis) Perceptions ofAmerican Indian Women, 59 N. M. HIST. REV. 234
(1984) (discussing inaccurate portrayal of American Indian women by reviewing and critiquing
writings of eighteenth and nineteenth century European explorers, travelers, and commentators).
"s The tribes addressed include the Fort Belknap Indian Community, Navajo Nation, Zuni
Pueblo, Jicarilla Apache, Standing Rock Sioux, Pascua-Yaqui, Cherokee Nation, Menominee,
Oglala Sioux, Laguna Pueblo, Rosebud Sioux, Salt River Pima-Maricopa, Blackfeet, and Crow.
t1 The Fort Belknap Indian Community, Navajo Nation, Zuni Pueblo, Jicarilla Apache,
Standing Rock Sioux, Pascua-Yaqui, Cherokee Nation, Menominee, Oglala Sioux. Rosebud
Sioux, and Crow have specific domestic violence code provisions. The Pueblo of Laguna and the
Salt River Pima-Maricopa do not have specific code provisions which address domestic violence.
Rather they utilize general criminal code provisions. These tribes will be examined as examples
of how tribes without specific domestic violence provisions address the problem. The law of the
Blackfeet tribe is not included in this survey of tribal law. This article only examines its domestic
violence prevention program.
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domestic violence and identifying the persons protected under the law.' 37
While our focus is on the protection of women, these laws are framed in
much broader terms. In this review, we look closely and consider these
codes not only in terms of the protections they afford women, but also in
terms of the protections afforded to all members of tribal society. 3'
Additionally we also consider how the laws reflect and impact tribal
society. A discussion of the above identified provisions will follow.
Unique provisions will also be discussed in so far as they reveal the
cultural perspectives that distinguish tribal societies.
B. Terms and Definitions
She tried finding all those words of expression
How to explain these feeling beyond depression
A true man
A true man's love
Is it too much to ask? 39
We begin with an overview of the persons protected by tribal law and
the behavior proscribed by these codes. All of the tribal codes reviewed
identify the persons protected and set forth what constitutes domestic
violence, domestic abuse, or spousal abuse. The tribal provisions vary in
that some tribes ascribe protection to a broad group of persons, while
others protect a narrow group of persons. Generally, women who are
spouses and family and household members are protected persons.1
40
Tribes, however, vary in their provisions by further qualifying the
definition of "spouse" and "family and household member" or by further
expanding the protected class. 14t  A minority of tribes restrict the
"I Other common provisions are those addressing reporting, arrests, holding offenders in
custody, protections afforded, requirements for counseling and participation in domestic violence
programs, access to property and support, and requirements for peace bonds.
38 Several tribes clearly state in their purpose sections that protections are not limited to
family members and recognize domestic abuse as a serious crime against tribal society as a
whole. See, e.g., Navajo Nation Domestic Abuse Protection Act, NAVAJO TRIB. CODE. tit. 9
§§ 1602-1604 (1993) (recognizing that domestic abuse affects all members of Navajo society);
STANDING ROCK SIOUX CODE OF JUSTICE, tit. XXV, § 25-101 (1990) (discussing purpose and
intent of code); JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE, tit. 3, § (1992) (noting that domestic violence
is "a serious crime against society"); STANDING ROCK SIOUX CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-
101 (1990) (discussing purpose and intent of code); ROSEBUD Sioux TRIB. CODE Ch. 38 (1989)
(indicating purpose section recognizes domestic abuse as "serious crime against . . . society").
139 JOHN TRUDELL & MARK SHARK, WHAT HE'D DONE, AKA GRAFITTI MAN (Rykodisc
1992).
"~ See infra app. A (illustrating variations among tribes in their definition of "spouse" and
"family or household member").
14 Id.
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definition by age and marital status. 142
Most tribes broaden the definition to include relationships without
reference to marital status or age. The Navajo Nation clearly identifies the
protected class and uses the identification to expand the class beyond that
of several state family violence protection provisions in the United
States.'43 Others protect a broad class through the use of a general term
such as "persons" when describing the individuals protected.'"
The Navajo Nation, the Jicarilla Apache tribe, and the Standing Rock
Sioux have provisions which specifically identify a broad class of protected
individuals. 45 The Navajo Nation Domestic Abuse Protection Act 1 6
specifically and unequivocally provides for the protection of a wide class
of persons. Under this law, the protected class includes persons who have
been directly affected by domestic abuse. 47 The Act specifically includes
any current or former member of the abuser's household or immediate
,42 See, e.g., ROSEBUD Sioux TRIB. CODE, ch. 38, § 1 A (1989) (stating that "[flamily
member or household member shall mean a relative, spouse, former spouse, adult, or elderly
person related by marriage"); CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES,
DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE, (1991).
'41 NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 1605(b) includes, for example, members and former
members of an abuser's immediate residence area, clan members, and any person who interacts
with the abuser in an employment, academic, recreational, religious, social or other setting. None
of the states in which the Navajo Nation is located (Arizona, New Mexico or Utah), nor any of
the states in which the other tribes lie, have comparable provisions which would clearly include
these relationships. For example, the protected class under the New Mexico Family Violence
Protection Act is household members. "Household member" is defined as "a spouse, former
spouse, family member, including a relative, parent, present or former stepparent, present or
former in-law, child or co-parent of a child, or a person with whom the petitioner has had a
continuing personal relationship." Family Violence Protection Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-
2(D) (Michie Supp. 1995).
"I The Oglala Sioux tribal code and the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Dept. of Public Service
Policy use the term "persons." See infra app. B, charts 1-5 (comparing tribal and state laws).
,. The "definitions" section of the Navajo Code specifically provides that all definitions be
construed liberally to protect all individuals who may be subject to domestic abuse. NAVAJO TRIB.
CODE tit. 9, § 1605 (1993). Similarly, the purpose of the Jicarilla Code is that "the entire
community" is to be treated with respect. JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, § 1 (1992).
'4 NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, §§ 1601 et seq. (1993). On July 28, 1993, President Peterson
Zah signed into law the Navajo Nation Domestic Abuse Act, Resolution No. CJY-53-93,
governing civil proceedings for domestic violence restraining orders. The Act did not affect
existing criminal law or procedures developed by the court governing conditions of release and
sentencing, but did have a small impact on the 1992 Rules for Domestic Violence Proceedings
which required some revision. See James W. Zion, Solicitor, Navajo Nation Judicial Branch, Law
Alert (Aug. 18, 1993). Domestic violence was brought to the public forum as the result of a two-
day public hearing held by the Judiciary, Public Safety, and the Health and Human Services
committees of the Navajo Nation Council, in cooperation with the Navajo Nation Judicial Branch
in October, 1991. The testimonies at the hearings shocked the committees and left only one
option: to take action. See Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 407-08.
147 NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 1605(b) (1993).
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residence area; anyone currently or previously involved in an intimate
relationship with the abuser; any person who interacts with the abuser in
an employment, academic, recreational, religious, social or other setting;
any offspring of the abuser; any relative or clan member of the abuser; any
elderly person; or any vulnerable person, including the emotionally and
physically disabled." 8 The Rules for Domestic Violence Proceedings for
the Courts of the Navajo Nation require that the definition of domestic
violence, which makes reference to the protected parties, be supplemented
by Navajo common law principles, such as the principle that recognizes
that special reciprocal relations exist in Navajo society among spouses and
family members. 49
A succession of violent acts resulting in the death of Navajo women
at the hands of their husbands and boyfriends brought domestic violence to
the center of Navajo public attention. 50 Witnesses presented testimony
to subcommittees of the Navajo Nation Council at public hearings held in
conjunction with the Navajo Nation Judicial Branch.'' "Jane Begay,"
the name used by one witness who did not wish to reveal her true identity,
was one woman who offered testimony. A portion of her testimony, as
related by one observer, is as follows:
He would wait until she was asleep, then violently pull her from bed to
confront her about her infidelity or the illegitimacy of the older child. It
got to the point where she was afraid to sleep. She once stayed up four
days in a row. She would do the chores, but forget what she was doing.
The last night, when she was completely exhausted, she ran from the
house without her shoes. She went up into the mountains, and covered
herself with pine needles so she couldn't be found. . . . The audience
was still as she told her story. She told it quietly, with soft emotion and
tears and people were ready to join in them. She softly told the story of
being trapped by a brutal cowboy, naively tied to him by a belief she was
"married" to him. She was driven from her grandparent's home by rape
1' Id. The broad class protected by the Navajo Nation is reflective of the traditional Navajo
legal system which is based on clan relationships and the two dynamic forces of traditional
Navajo law: K'e and K'ei. See Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, Hozhooji Naat'aanii: The
Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 10 MEDIATION Q. 327 (1993). K'e includes positive
values such as compassion, cooperation, friendliness, unselfishness and peacefulness which create
solidarity in society. Id. at 329. "K'ei is a special kind of k'e: it refers to the clan system of
descent relationships and groups of relatives a person is connected to, tied by the virtues of k'e."
Id. (citations omitted).
149 RULES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROCEEDINGS, COURTS OF THE NAVAJO NATION, Rule
1.5.
"5 See Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 407-08.
151 Id.
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and molestation, severely treated by her parents, treated as a captive by
the denying father of her children, and given more abuse by her own
family when she returned to it. She painted the picture of a brutal, male
world, where abuse, accusations of sexual misconduct, and attempted rape
were commonplace. 152
Women on the Council, on the Navajo Nation bench, and within the
government and the community were instrumental in the lengthy process
involved in the passage of the Act. This involvement ranged from insisting
that the issue be addressed to drafting the law and working on its passage.
The voice that "Jane Begay" found that day was heard. Perhaps she
spoke because the reality of domestic violence was too important to be left
to the boredom and detachment of statistics and official reports. What she
related required tremendous courage. She exposed herself and her relatives
to those who knew her, and her story dealt with taboo subjects: mistreat-
ment by men and sexuality.53  Her family's response revealed the
breakdown of her "special reciprocal relations" in Navajo society that
should have shielded her. Her story was filled with relatives she shared
households with: grandparents, aunts, parents, and cousins. The Nation,
in the resolution approving the Domestic Abuse Act, speaks of the Navajo
tradition of protecting household members from violence."I4 Jane's story
illustrates the breadth of the household.
The Jicarilla Apache Tribal Code broadly defines domestic violence
as "[a]n act of abuse by a perpetrator on a family member or household
member of the perpetrator."'15  Included within the definition of a
"member" of the perpetrator's family or household are current and former
spouses, 5 15 people related by blood, people related by an existing or prior
152 James W. Zion, Jane Begay's Story 6,7 (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
St. John's Law Review).
153 See generally Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 416-22 (discussing causes of institutionalized
violence against Navajo women).
I" Res. CJY-53-93(5), Navajo Nation Tribal Council (1993).
,55 See JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, § 2(C) (1992).
156 Id. § 2(E). Jicarilla's current code provisions protecting spouses contrast sharply with
accounts of the prior interaction between Apache spouses. While the accuracy of such accounts
is a separate inquiry (and one which concerns the authors) it must be underscored that such
accounts often create the false impression that the observed or documented practice was the
accepted norm. See LEVINSON, supra note 133, at 34 (discussing punishments used by husbands).
H. Henrietta Stockel, for example, states: "An Apache woman could expect to be beaten by her
husband for any infraction of his rules; a woman who committed adultery ran the risk of having
her nose cut off at its tip by her enraged husband ... if she were caught." H. HENRIETTA
STOCKEL, WOMEN OF THE APACHE NATION: VOICES OF TRUTH 18 (1991). The modem Jicarilla
Code establishes a contrary norm, which is more in line with another practice observed by the
Apache. See id. at 15 ("When Apache women had to walk far from home or camp to find food,
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marriage, people currently or formerly residing with the perpetrator, or a
person with whom the perpetrator has a child in common, regardless of
whether the parents of the child have been married or have lived together
at any time. 57 Under the purpose section of the code, elders, adults, and
children are identified as intended beneficiaries of the code."'8
The domestic abuse chapter of the Standing Rock Code 59 also
protects a broad class of individuals under the definition of "family" or
"household members."'" While the Standing Rock Code protects the
same parties as the Jicarilla Code, the Standing Rock Code also includes
persons who are in a dating relationship 6' and, for purposes of the
issuance of a domestic violence protection order, any other person with a
sufficient relationship as determined by the court.162 The purpose section
of the code states that it is the intent of the Council that "criminal laws be
enforced without regard to whether the persons involved are family
members, are or were married, cohabitating, or involved in a relation-
ship." 163
The above tribal codes clearly extend the protected class beyond the
conventional boundaries of the nuclear family."6 The persons protected
by these tribal codes reflect the extensive degree of interaction in the Indian
community between and among extended family members and within
societal units unique to tribal society, such as clans.
Other tribes, such as the Salt River Pima-Maricopa and the Oglala
Sioux, protect a broad class through use of the term "persons." "
they were accompanied by certain men whose job it was to protect them from all human and
animal dangers."). To understand contemporary tribal societies, people must obtain accurate
descriptions of historical and contemporary practices, differentiate anecdotal information from
established norms, and properly interpret the information.
i5 JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit.3, § 2(E) (1992).
158 id. § 1.
'9 STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV (1990).
1' See id. § 25-102(C).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. § 25-101.
'" See supra notes 144-162 (discussing broad range of protection afforded by tribal codes).
'6' OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE Section 99.2, §§ 1-23 passim (1982) (using "persons"
throughout code). Enacted in 1982, the Oglala Sioux Domestic Abuse Code was the first in Indian
code to recognize spouse abuse as a crime. The Sacred Shawl Women's Society-Sina Wakan
Win Okolakiciye-lobbied for its enactment by the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council. See Plume, supra
note 2, at 67. The Oglala Lakota Women's Society and the Tiwahe Gluonihanpi, a victims'
advocate group against child abuse and domestic abuse, were instrumental in getting enough
resolutions passed in various districts so that the ordinance could be passed. See Avis Little
Eagle, Pros and Cons of Mandatory Arrest Policy at Pine Ridge, THE LAKOTA TIMEs, Dec. 4,
1990, at A10 [hereinafter Little Eagle, Pros and Cons] (discussing mandatory arrest code).
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Although the Oglala Sioux Domestic Abuse Code does not define the
protected class as clearly as other codes,'6 the arrest provisions of the
code reveal who is to be protected. It is mandatory to arrest someone
pursuant to the code for: assaulting another "person" he/she lives with or
used to live with; 67 contacting a "victim" in violation of an order of
protection; threatening with a dangerous weapon; 68 and placing the
"victim" in immediate fear of bodily harm following a call to the
police.' 69  The terms used to refer to the protected class are "persons"
and "victims." 70 The only restriction on the term "persons" is that the
persons currently reside or formerly resided together. 17' The term
"persons" apparently encompasses both immediate and extended family
members, within or without a legally recognized marriage relationship', as
well as others without blood relationship. Likewise, the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Tribe's Department of Public Safety Policy (DPS) protects
"persons" with whom the alleged assailant currently resides or formerly
resided." Therefore, the Oglala Code and Salt River Policy exceed most
166 The title section of the code states that the code may be cited as the domestic abuse code
or the spouse abuse code. OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2, § 1 (1982). "Abuse" and
.spouse" are then defined in § 2 but neither definition identifies the protected class. Id. § 2.
Instead, terms such as "persons," "victim," "parties," and "family and household member" are
used when referring to the protected class, but none of them are defined. See id. Therefore, it
appears that the code could be interpreted to apply to a much broader group of persons than to
those typically included under the term "spouse". Additionally, even though the term "spouse"
is defined, the definition is framed in relation to the abusing party, rather than the protected
party. See id. ("'Spouse' means a person with whom the victim is currently living. . . ."). This
provision makes it quite clear that neither marital status nor present cohabitation circumstances
are to be considered when applying the law to offenders.
167 OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE see. 99.2, § 3(a). The manner in which the code limits the
term spouse to include only the abusing party raises some interesting issues in relation to the
arrest provisions. The abusing class-as defined by the term "spouse"-is larger than the class
which can be arrested for assault. Spouse is defined as the abusing party who has currently or
in the past lived with a victim, or with whom the victim has had a child in common regardless
of marital status or cohabitation. Id. § 2(b). Under the arrest provisions, a person (including the
abusing spouse) can only be arrested for assault if the person assaulted is currently residing or
has in the past resided with the person to be arrested. Id. § 3(a). Excluded from arrest is the
abusing party defined under "spouse" with whom the victim has had a child, but who has not
cohabitated with the victim.
168 Id. § 3(c). No term is used to identify the protected class under the provision which
provides for arrest for threat with a dangerous weapon. An assumption is made here that the
protected class would be "persons" in general; whether present or former cohabitation would be
required is not clear from the code provisions.
16 Id. § 3(d).
170 Id. §§ 3(a), (b), (d).
'7i OGLALA Stoux TRIB. CODE, Section 99.2, §§ 3(b), (d).
I7- Salt River Pima-Maricopa, Dept. of Public Safety, General Order No. 89-25 (Mar. 23,
1988). The Department of Public Safety (the tribal police department) developed a policy
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other tribal provisions in "persons protected," by using the general term
"persons," to include persons without regard to age, marital status, or
blood relationship. The Salt River Pima-Maricopa DPS Policy also
illustrates how some tribes protect victims of domestic abuse through the
use of existing criminal code provisions. 73
While the term "persons" in the Oglala Code and Salt River Pima
Policy encompasses a potentially limitless class, the requirement that
"persons" currently reside or formerly resided together arguably restricts
protection to those individuals who typically live together, such as family
members and couples. Despite this, all persons in a domestic living
arrangement are essentially protected, no matter what relationship exists
between the parties.
There are other tribal provisions which are narrower in comparison to
the above mentioned provisions. Generally, these codes protect household
members and relatives from acts of violence. While these provisions are
more limited, it is important to note that the majority of these codes protect
the broader relational network which exists in Indian communities. Take
for example, the protections afforded under the law of the Pascua-Yaqui.
The Pascua-Yaqui law specifically protects children under fifteen who are
the victims of domestic violence 74 and for all other offenses requires that
the relationship between the victim and the defendant is one of marriage
or former marriage, or of persons of the opposite sex residing or having
resided in the same household, or [that] the victim and the defendant or
the defendant's spouse are related to each other by consanguinity or
affinity to the second degree. 5
Thus, the protected class would include married and divorced persons, a
regarding the handling of domestic violence incidents. The tribe does not have a domestic
violence code. Instead, the enabling law used is the criminal code.
73 Many tribes, such as Laguna Pueblo, that do not have domestic violence codes also
prosecute acts of domestic violence under existing criminal codes. See Interview with Judge
William Bluehouse Johnson, Laguna Pueblo Court in New Mexico (Mar. 24, 1994). In addition,
the enacting resolution for the Crow Tribe's Domestic Abuse Code acknowledges that acts of
domestic violence were previously punished as disorderly conduct, assault or assault and battery.
Res. No. 91-16, Crow Tribal Council (Jan. 12, 1991).
114 PASCUA-YAQUI TRIB. CODE ch. 11, § 1101(A) (1992). The specific crimes proscribed
are second degree murder, aggravated assault resulting in serious physical injury committed by
the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, sexual assault, molestation, sexual contact,
sexual exploitation, child abuse, kidnapping, sexual abuse, taking a child for the purposes of
prostitution, child prostitution, and involving or using minors in drug offenses. Id.
" Id. § 1102(A). The language used by the Pascua-Yaqui is similar to the language used in
the Arizona statute. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(a) (1986) (amended 1993). It appears
that Arizona state law served as a model for the Pascua-Yaqui code in two areas: the parties
protected and the acts proscribed. See infra app. A; app. B, chart 1.
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partner or unrelated individual of the opposite sex currently or previously
residing in the same household, children and stepchildren of the defendant,
and other relatives of the defendant or the defendant's spouse, who are
related by blood, ancestry or marriage to the second degree.
Another example can be found in the Cherokee Nation Code. The
Cherokee Nation's "protected class" includes those who are most in need
of protection by society: the aged, the young, and the physically
challenged. 76  Additionally, the tribe's code covers "parents. " l17
Parents often are targets of abuse from older teenage children, alcohol- or
chemically-dependent adult children, or mentally unstable adult children.
In tribal communities, it is not unusual to have extended family members
live in one household. Often, adult children remain in their parents'
household or parents will move in with their adult children. Households
consisting of three generations are not unusual in Native American society.
A substantial number of tribal domestic violence codes, however, limit
their protections to adults only. Some tribal codes are more restrictive than
others. These tribes include the Rosebud, 17  Crow,179  Fort Bel-
knap, 8 ° Zuni,' and the Menominee."
Rosebud and Crow domestic violence codes contain similar provisions
regarding "protected parties.""n Both codes cover family or household
members. Under Rosebud law, a "family" or "household member" is "a
relative, spouse, former spouse, adult or elderly person related by marriage
or an adult or elderly person who resides or formerly resided in the
residence.""' 4 The purpose section of the domestic abuse code indicates
176 Protection From Domestic Abuse Act, CHEROKEE NATION CODE tit. 22, § 60.1(2) (1993).
Cherokee Code provisions are very similar to Oklahoma law. See infra App. B, Chart 5.
'n CHEROKEE NATION CODE tit. 22, § 60.1(2) (1993). Research on parent abuse is not as
extensive as research on child, spouse, or elder abuse. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN OVERVIEW 16 (1991) [hereinafter FAMILY VIOLENCE].
Parents can be severely injured by children, particularly when assaulted by older youths and
adolescents. Id. Occasionally, these assaults result in the death of a parent (parricide). Parricide
may be explained as a response to parental abuse directed toward the youth, adolescent, or
another family member. Id. Parents who are abused report that they are ashamed of their
children's violent behavior and are afraid they will be blamed for its occurrence, as a result few
parents seek help and few community services are available. Id.
,78 See ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIB. CODE ch. 38 (1989).
179 See CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE
(1991).
184 See FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (1989).
181 See ZUNI TRIBE, ORDINANCE No. 52, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CODE (1991).
18 See MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE No. 93-21, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1993).
'" See ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIB. CODE Ch. 38 (1989); CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW
AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE (1991).
184 ROSEBUD Sioux TRIB. CODE ch. 38, § 1(A) (1989).
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that the protected class includes people regardless of whether they "are
family members, were or are married, cohabiting or involved in a
relationship."'" While the terms "relative" and "spouse" ensure the
protection of minors such as teenage spouses and children, the inclusion of
"adult," in reference to persons presently or formerly residing together,
excludes minors who cohabitate or reside in the household but are not
related.
Under Crow Law, "family member" or "household member" is
defined as a spouse, adult person related by marriage, or adult person who
resides or formerly resided in the same residence.'86 Due to the use of
the word "adult" and the definition of "spouse" which excludes the victim
spouse, this code apparently provides no protection to minors unless they
are emancipated by marriage. Its narrow protection, however, is expanded
in situations where the victim has been placed in immediate fear of bodily
harm.'87 The code allows a law enforcement officer to arrest a perpetra-
tor when responding to a domestic violence call involving "persons (of any
age) residing together or who have resided together in the past. " l The
protected class is small and centered around relationships created by
marriage or residency. Adult status is required unless the relationship
involving a minor is created by a legal marriage. The requirement of
marriage or co-residency combined with adult status limits the class. Blood
'8 Id. (Purpose).
'8 See CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE
§ 3(c) (1991). "Adult" is defined as anyone age 18 or older or emancipated as husband and wife.
Id. § 3(c)(1). "Spouse" is defined as:
a person with whom the victim is currently living or who has lived with the victim in
the past, regardless of whether they are/were married, OR, a person with whom the
victim has a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or lived
together at any time.
Id. § 3(b) (emphasis added). As in the Oglala Code, "spouse" is defined so as to describe the
abuser only and does not include the victimized spouse. Id.; see also OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE
see. 99.2, § 2(b) (1982). An argument can be made that the inclusion of spouse under the Crow
definition of "family member or household member" requires an interpretation of the code which
includes victim spouses as protected persons. CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER
CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE § 3(c). If victims are included in the definition of "spouse," the
victim is protected if the parties are currently living or have lived together in the past, regardless
of marital status or cohabitation. Id. § 3(b). Further, the definition of "spouse" contains no
requirement that the spouse be an adult. Id.
197 CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE
§ 4(C) (1991).
11 Id. Notice the similar use of the term "persons" in the Crow law and the Oglala Code.
Cf. OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2 § 2(b) (1982). Nevertheless, a different interpretation
results because the Crow code definition of abuse describes the class protected, i.e., family or
household member, while the Oglala Code defines abuse but does not specifically clarify the class
protected. See id. § 2.
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relations are included only if the residency and adult requirements are met.
The Fort Belknap Code defines "abuse" without reference to the
protected class.'89 However, the protected class can be found in the
provisions for arrest. Persons can be arrested for past or future domestic
abuse of a "spouse" or "family member," 190 but as with both the
Crow' 9' and Oglala Codes,1" it is only the abusing spouse who is
included in the definition of "spouse."" 9 The Fort Belknap Code defines
"family members" as "a spouse, former spouse, adult person related by
blood or marriage [or] any person residing in the home who is dependent
upon the head of the household," including elders and children." The
Fort Belknap provision is more expansive than the Crow provision, as it
includes adult blood relatives and dependents of any age that reside in the
home.
The protected class is also limited under both Menominee law and
Zuni law, to include a spouse or former spouse, adults residing together,
adults who formerly resided together, and adults who have had a child
together. 95 The Zuni Code also protects "persons" who have a child or
had a relationship with the offender. 196 This provision does not require
the "person" to be an adult. Otherwise, the Zuni and Menominee codes
only protect those within a legal marriage or adult relationships involving
cohabitation or children.
Resticting protection to adults is significant. Generally, restrictions to
adults occur when describing relationships between couples. These
restrictions may occur because domestic violence is typically thought of as
occurring only between married couples and because marriage is generally
thought of as occurring between adults. Restricting a protected category
to adults excludes minors from the class.
This result has varying degrees of impact. Under codes which are not
entirely restricted to adults, certain minors are protected nevertheless
's FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Definitions) (a) (1989).
'g Id. (Mandatory Arrest Provision) (a).
'g' See CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODE, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE
§ (3)(b) (1991).
1- See OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE Section 99.2, § 2(b) (1982).
I93 d. (Definitions) § (a); see supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation
of law necessary to include victim spouses in protected class).
194 FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Definitions) (c) (1989).
'95 MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE No. 93-21, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE § III (A) (1993)
(prohibiting domestic violence by adult person); ZUNI TRIBE, ORDINANCE No. 52, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CODE (Definition) (1991).
196 ZUNI TRiB. ORDINANCE No. 52, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CODE (Definition) (1991).
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because they fall within other categories that do not require adult
status."9 On the other hand, minors who cohabitate or who have had a
child out of wedlock are excluded in some of the aforementioned
codes. 19 Yet abusive behavior may begin in the dating relationship of
minors. 199 Additionally, the high rate of teen pregnancy may result in
couples living together prior to attaining adult status. Thus, restricting the
protected class to adults is likely to exclude minors in need of the same
protections as adults. Abuse which occurs between minor siblings' and
against parents by minors may also be excluded in codes which apply to
adults only.
The extended family plays a significant role in tribal life. Evidence
of this role may be noted in the statutory presence which the extended
family has in most tribal laws regarding domestic abuse. 1 Many of the
tribes clarify their intent to include members of the immediate and extended
family by expressly listing children, the elderly, persons related by blood,
and persons related by marriage within the protected class.' ° Additional-
ly, some tribes even protect persons who fall outside the extended
family. 3 These protections demonstrate the great emphasis certain tribes
place on addressing group disharmony and maintaining proper relationships
within tribal communities.
'91 See FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Definitions) (c) (1989)
(protecting family members, including minors who "resid[e] in the home [and are] dependent
upon the head of the household.").
19 See MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE NO. 93-21, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE § III (A)
(restricting domestic violence and domestic abuse to enumerated acts "engaged in by an adult
person against his or her spouse or former spouse, against an adult with whom the person resides
or formerly resided or against an adult with whom the person has created a child").
,9 See Asetoyer, supra note 4, at 2.
1 Although knowledge about sibling abuse is limited, there are some factors that appear to
contribute to its occurrence. See FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 177, at 17. Society accepts
sibling rivalry as part of family life, and it is not unusual for siblings to use violence as a means
of gaining control. Id. When parents fail to intervene to stop the violence, they are giving tacit
permission for the sibling abuse to occur and recur. Id. Children tend to learn about violent
behavior from the mass media and, sometimes, from their parents or peers. Id. Children who
witness or experience such violence tend to use it against their siblings. Id. Finally, some children
and parents suffer from emotional problems or personality disorders that are manifested through
sibling abuse and parental failure to protect the child victim of the abuse. FAMILY VIOLENCE,
supra note 177, at 17.
2o See, e.g., ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIB. CODE ch. 38, § 1(A) (1989) (stating that family member
includes any adult or elderly person who resides or formerly resided in same residence).
M JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, §§ 2(D), (E) (1992); STANDING ROCK SIOUX
TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-102(c) (1990); FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION,
DOMESTIC ABUSE, (Definitions) (c) (1989); ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIB. CODE ch. 38, § 1(A) (1989).
1 See, e.g., OGLALA SIOUX TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2, § 3(c) (1982) (stating that officer can
arrest any person who threatens another with dangerous weapons).
[Vol. 69:69
TRIBAL PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN
The charts in Appendix A reveal some similarities between tribal laws
concerning "protected persons" and domestic violence statutes of the state
where the particular tribes are located. To the extent tribes are interested
in protecting the same relationships as do states, this influence is under-
standable. To the extent, however, that tribes seek to develop laws to
protect relationships inherent in the particular tribe, to reflect the
composition of tribal households, and to describe the households and
relationships commonly occurring on the reservation in the protected class,
state law may be either too narrow or too reflective of mainstream society.
The unique relationships among tribal people may add parties uncommon
to state law, or require different descriptors.
The importance of protecting and maintaining the relationships within
the extended family is also reflected in tribal court opinions and orders."°4
In Moran v. Rosebud Housing Authority, °5 for example, the Rosebud
Sioux Court of Appeals narrowed a broad injunctive order issued to protect
a victim of abuse from violent behavior. The tribal court took this action
to allow the defendant and her children to visit the defendant's grandmoth-
er."° This decision was in accord with the important concept of tiyos-
paye, the Lakota word meaning "the relatives living together."'
Among Navajos, where clan and kinship relations are central and create
strong duties and responsibilities, members may say of a wrongdoer,' [h]e
acts as if he has no relatives.""0  This statement is intended to describe
a person who fails to act responsibly toward members of his own clan.'
"' See, e.g., Wike v. Tarasiewicz, 14 Indian L. Rptr. 6020, 6022 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct.
1987) (refusing to grant deference to State court order granting custody to children's mother on
grounds that children's welfare and interest of tribe is in maintaining father's custody which
provides benefits of "extended family kinship"); see also Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of
Navajo Labor Relations, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6105 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding
employer hiring policy denying jobs to "relatives by marriage" but allowing jobs to "blood
relations" is discriminatory since marriage is central in Navajo custom of extended family and
clan); In re C.D.S. & C.M.H., 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6083 (Ct. of Indian Offenses for the Delaware
Tribe of W. Okla. 1988) (determining customary belief and practice of extended family and
providing visitation right for grandparent).
19 Indian L. Rptr. 6106 (Rosebud Sioux Ct. App. 1991).
205 Id. at 6108.
0 Plume, supra note 2, at 68. Tiyospaye is defined in the glossary as relatives living
together; a band or division of a tribe. See Pommersheim, supra note 62, at 438 (discussing rela-
tional fabric of tribal life and law, inseparably manifest in "legal decision whether to grant
'standing' in a custody dispute to a member of the extended family or tiyospaye who is neither
the mother nor the father of the child").
= See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 17 Indian L. Rptr. at 6112 (quoting popular Navajo saying to
describe someone who has committed wrong against society).
I James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court, PERCEPTION, Fall/Winter 1991, at 48.
Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 148, at 331.
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Other tribes share in this belief and practice of respecting extended family
relationships. These beliefs are reflected in enacted codes 210 or through
the recognition of these beliefs and through tribal common law.21
C. Behavior Proscribed
It is the intent of the Jicarilla Apache Tribal Council that the official
response to cases of domestic violence shall be that violent behavior is not
to be tolerated or excused, whether or not the abuser is intoxicated. The
elders, adults, and children of our Tribe, and of the entire community
residing on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation, are to be cherished and
treated with respect. 212
The behavior proscribed by the tribal codes varies from a broad range
of behavior to certain criminal offenses against persons generally associated
with domestic violence.213
The Oglala Sioux Domestic Abuse Code defines abuse as "physical
harm, bodily injury, assault or the infliction of fear of imminent physical
harm, bodily injury or assault." 214  The Crow provisions differ slightly
from the Oglala Sioux code. In addition to the acts included in the Oglala
code, abuse under Crow law includes bodily "harm" or imminent bodily
"harm" to any family or household member.2 ' Under the Salt River
Policy, an officer can arrest a person for simple assault or battery,216
aggravated assault and battery,1 7 and a violation of an order of protection
restraining the person or excluding the person from the residence.
218
The Rosebud Sioux and the Menominee codes are similar in that they
proscribe abusive acts committed with specific intent. The Rosebud Sioux
define domestic abuse as a crime219 and prohibit purposely or knowingly
210 See infra App. B, charts 1-5.
211 See Valencia-Weber, supra note 30, at 250.
212 JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, § 1 (1992).
213 See infra App. B, charts 1-5 (comparing behaviors proscribed by tribes with those of states
in which tribes lie).
214 OGLALA SIOUX TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2, § 2(a) (1982). Both the Standing Rock Sioux and
Fort Belknap Indian Community domestic violence laws proscribe the same acts as the Oglala.
FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Definition) (a) (1989); STANDING
ROCK SIOUX CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-102(A) (1990) (defining "abuse" and "domestic
violence," respectively, with same terms used to define "abuse" by Oglala Sioux Tribal Code).
215 CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODE, DOMESTiC ABUSE CODE § 3(a)
(1991).
216 Salt River Pima-Maricopa, Dep't. of Pub. Safety, General Order No. 89-25, 2 (citing
to § 6.51 - Simple Assault or Battery).
217 Id. 1 1 (citing to § 6.52 - Aggravated Assault and Battery).
2_11 Id. 3 (citing to § 6.42 - Disobedience to Lawful Orders of Court).
219 ROSEBUD Sioux TRIB. CODE ch. 38, § 2 (1989).
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causing bodily injury or apprehension of bodily injury to a family member
or household member.' Bodily injury includes physical pain, illness,
or an impairment of one's physical condition. 1  Causing apprehension
includes any physical act intended to cause another person to reasonably
fear imminent serious bodily injury or death.' Under the Menominee -
Code domestic violence is defined as intentional infliction of physical pain,
physical injury or illness, intentional impairment of physical condition, or
a physical act that may cause the other person to reasonably fear imminent
engagement in any of the above.'
The Zuni Pueblo, Jicarilla Apache, and Navajo tribes broaden the
behavior which is categorized as domestic violence. This is accomplished
by including other types of offenses proscribed under the tribes' general
criminal code. Under Zuni law, domestic violence includes any act or
incident which constitutes a crime under the Zuni Tribal Code resulting in
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, or a threat which places a person
in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm or bodily injury.' The
Jicarilla Apache Domestic Violence Code states that abuse includes, but is
not limited to, assault and battery as defined in the Jicarilla Apache Tribal
code.? Navajo law incorporates criminal offenses more liberally by
proscribing "domestic violence," including any conduct that constitutes an
offense under Navajo law. 6
The Navajo domestic violence law includes the following acts upon a
victim: assault, battery, threatening, coercion, confinement, damage to
property, emotional abuse, and harassment. 227 In addition, any other
conduct that constitutes a tort under Navajo law qualifies as domestic
violence.m Navajo law also clearly provides that domestic abuse does not
include a victim's reasonable act of self-defense. 9 Under the Rules for
Domestic Violence Proceedings, when parties fall out of harmony, they
"0 Id. § 2(1)-(2).
221 Id. § 1(C).2 Id. § I(C).
2 MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE No. 93-21, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE §§ III(A)(1-3)
(1993).
2 ZUNI TRIBE, ORDINANCE No. 52, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CODE (Definitions) (1991).
225 JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, § 2(a) (1992).
1 Navajo Nation Domestic Abuse Protection Act, NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 1605(a)(1)
(1993).
7 Id.
213 RULES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROCEEDINGS, COURTS OF THE NAvAJO NATION Rule
1.3 (b).
22 NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 1605(a)(2) (1993).
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must proceed in a cautious way in their relations with each other (hoz-
hogo), and any definition of domestic violence must be interpreted in such
a way as to identify any instances of disharmony. 3
The Navajo, the Jicarilla Apache, and Cherokee Nation codes also
specifically include sexual offenses in their definition of abuse.3 The
Cherokee Nation further defines domestic abuse as causing or attempting
to cause serious physical harm or threatening another with imminent
serious physical harm.3 This definition includes, but is not limited to,
assault, battery, and aggravated assault and battery against family or
household members. 33
The Pascua-Yaqui Tribal Code forbids behavior by specifying acts
beyond assault, physical injury, and intimidation. The code defines
domestic violence as any act which is a dangerous crime against chil-
dren.3 4  These acts range from murder to drug offenses.3 Domestic
violence also includes custodial interference, unlawful imprisonment,
kidnapping, criminal trespass, and disorderly conduct.3 6
D. Tribal Remedies and Sanctions
There was no evidence of penal systems. Only the worst lawbreak-
ers were labelled, but remained an integral part of the community because
of their important roles in defining the boundaries of appropriate and
inappropriate behavior. Their actions were viewed as the result of natural
human error which required corrective intervention by elders. Customary
penalties were used for the purpose of helping the offender make amends
and to restore self-respect and dignity. The goal was to cure and cleanse
the offender of the bad thoughts causing the negative behavior. This was
accomplished by having the offender apologize and be forgiven by the
victim, their relatives, and village officials who were present at a
gathering. (The terms gathering and family gatherings are translated
words used to describe the traditional court process for conflict and
21 RULES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROCEEDINGS, COURTS OF THE NAVAJO NATION Rule
1.5.
"' The Jicarilla Apache Code includes sexual assault or the infliction of the fear of sexual
assaults within its definition of abuse, in addition to the infliction of physical harm or bodily
injury. JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, § 2(A) (1992). The Cherokee Code includes rape
within its definition of domestic abuse. Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, CHEROKEE NATION
CODE tit. 22, § 60.1(1)(c) (1990). The Navajo Nation includes sexual abuse. NAVAJO TRIB. CODE
tit. 9, § 1605(a)(1)(I)(1993).
232 CHEROKEE NATION CODE tit. 22, § 60.1(1) (1990).
233 Id.
2 PASCUA-YAQUI TRIB. CODE ch. 11., § 11-1102(A) (1992).
2 Id. § 11-1101(A)(1-13).
36 Id. § 11-1102(A) (citing §§ 11-1101(H)-(L)).
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dispute resolution. In this process the first level of intervention begins
with the family patriarch or other related elder designated by the family).
The objective of this process was not to punish the offender; rather, the
focal point of customary justice and sanctions was atonement by the
offender to the entire social group.
This viewpoint towards crime has continued with some variations.
Criminal and civil acts have been redefined in written law and order codes
adopted by most Pueblos and approved by the Secretary of Interior.
Formal structures such as tribal courts and law enforcement exist in most
Pueblos. Research conducted in two Pueblo communities indicate that
tribal [traditional] methods for handling offenders are still being used to
deal with contemporary problems. 23
The majority of the tribal codes reviewed provide greater or equal
protection to victims of domestic violence when compared to the states in
which these tribes are located."~s This is accomplished by proscribing a
wide range of acts and behavior, and by protecting the physical integrity
of an expansive class. The effectiveness of these provisions obviously is
contingent upon the enforcement and actual reporting of incidents, as well
as the final action taken against perpetrators.
Some tribes blend methods of traditional dispute resolution into the
formal judicial process. This practice is evident in the specific provisions
of the Navajo Nation's Domestic Abuse Protection Act and Supreme Court
Rules for Domestic Violence.? 9 The judges of the Navajo Nation courts
11 Ada Pecos Melton, Traditional and Contemporary Justice in Pueblo Communities 7-8
(unpublished manuscript, on file with St. John's Law Review).
3 See Family Violence Protection Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(C) (Michie Supp. 1995)
(defining domestic abuse as any incident resulting in physical harm, severe emotional distress,
bodily injury or assault, threat causing imminent fear of bodily injury, criminal trespass, criminal
damage to property, repeatedly driving by a residence or workplace, telephone harassment,
stalking, harassment, or harm or threatened harm to children); see also infra App. A and B
(illustrating charts).
23 NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 1652 (1993); RULES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROCEED-
INGS, COURTS OF THE NAVAJO NATION Rule 2.3. The Supreme Court may allocate authority to
the Navajo Peacemaker Court to address domestic abuse in cases in which the victim consents.
NAvAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 1652 (1993). The victim does have the option of going before a
peacemaker or the Family Court. Id. § 1652(a). Parties may initiate a proceeding in the
peacemaker court. Additionally, the district and family courts may refer all or part of a domestic
violence matter to a peacemaker court. RULES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROCEEDINGS, COURTS
OF THE NAVAJO NATION Rule 2.3. The peacemaker courts of the Seneca Nation in New York
also acted as traditional dispute resolution institutions and served as a model for the Quakers in
America. See Oren Lyons, Land of the Free, Home of the Brave, in INDIAN ROOTS OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 30, 33-34 (Jose Barrerro ed., 1992). Their jurisdiction was recognized since the
mid-19th century and remains so under New York State Law, and their judgments are to be
enforced by state courts. N.Y. INDIAN LAw Art. 4, § 46 (McKinney 1950). New York law
provides for the jurisdiction of the Seneca peacemaker courts over three Indian reservations: the
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established the Peacemaking system in 1982.24 Peacemakers work with
people to help them take care of their problems on their own.24 Peace-
makers are community leaders who employ the traditional Navajo method
of "talking things out" to resolve problems. The Peacemakers use
traditional methods of mediation and arbitration, but it should be noted that
Navajo mediation and arbitration is different from the American "media-
tion" and "arbitration" models.242  Many counselors to victims of
domestic violence feel that mediation is inappropriate between the victim
and the abuser.243 The Peacemakers are tied to each of the seven district
courts of the Navajo Nation.2'
Other tribes, such as the Pueblos, accomplish this blend through the
general recognition of traditional methods of dispute resolution. One
example is the Pueblo of Laguna. The tribe incorporates the traditional
method of dispute resolution into its formal judicial system. 5 The
Pueblo recognizes the traditional authority of village officials to assist
village members in resolving disputes without resorting to the court. The
person seeking relief, however, possesses the choice of utilizing the
traditional method of dispute resolution or of going to court. In addition,
the Pueblo has a special method of dispute resolution for married couples,
involving sponsors of couples who marry in the traditional manner.2'
Allegany, the Cattaraugus and the Tonawanda. Id.
2 Zion, The Navajo Nation Peacemaker Court: An Introduction 2 (July 7, 1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with St. John's Law Review).
24 See id. at 1.
2' See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 148, at 327 (addressing differences between Navajo
mediation and arbitration and general American models of mediation and arbitration); see also
Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 423-25 (noting that Navajo process of mediation and arbitration
not only involves particular families, but also includes clan); Donovan, supra note 72, at Al
(noting that function of peacemaker courts, mediation, and arbitration is to preserve harmony
among families and Indian community).
243 See Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 423; see also Family Violence Protection Act, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3(D) (Michie Supp. 1995) ("If any other domestic action is pending between
the petitioner and the respondent, the parties shall not be compelled to mediate any aspects of the
case arising from the Family Violence Protection Act unless the court finds that appropriate
safeguards exist to protect each of the parties and that both parties can fairly mediate with such
safeguards.").
I Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 423.
2' PUEBLO OF LAGUNA CONST. art. V, § 5.
1 See Eileen Lente-Kasero, Laguna Tribal Court, Family Mediation - Focus on Family
Disputes (marriage/divorce) in the Native American Community 2 (Dec. 2, 1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the St. John's Law Review). Lente-Kasero reports that:
[e]ach partner would have a set of sponsors/witnesses. The parenis usually would
make the selection because of the role which the sponsors play. They are charged with
the responsibility as advisors and mediators for the newlyweds. The spon-
sors/witnesses are usually an older couple within the community or sometimes
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The sponsors assist married couples in resolving their disputes by
reminding them of their marriage vows, counseling them, and bringing the
extended family into the dispute' resolution process.247 This method is
available to those couples who choose to use it. This practice is common
to other New Mexico Pueblos.2' Sponsors, however, have now assumed
more of a ceremonial role in the traditional marriage ceremony. As a
result, couples are less inclined to utilize this traditional method. The
Pueblo of Laguna, like several other Pueblos and tribes, does not have a
specific code on domestic violence.249
Primarily the domestic abuse codes reviewed are divided into three
basic categories. The Zuni, Pascua-Yaqui, Standing Rock, Oglala, and
Jicarilla tribes have enacted provisions which combine criminal and civil
sanctions and remedies.5 0 Other tribes, such as the Navajo Nation and
the Cherokee Nations, have enacted codes which provide civil remedies and
sanctions only." While these codes refer to the criminal sanctions
available, the actual prosecution for acts of domestic violence is treated
separately under a tribe's criminal law. The domestic violence codes of the
Rosebud Sioux, Crow, Fort Belknap, and the Menominee Nation qualify
as another category. Under this category, the tribal codes are strictly
criminal in nature." z Civil remedies and sanctions only are available
traditional leaders within the community.
Id.
7 Id. ("The sponsors/witnesses would be the responsible parties to bring the couple together
along with their parents and elder family members.").
24 See generally EDWARD H. SPICER ET AL., PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURE
CHANGE (1961) (discussing cultural practices among nineteen New Mexican pueblo including
pueblos of Taos, Picuris, San Juan, Santa Clara, Nambe, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, Tesuque,
Santo Domingo, Cochiti, San Felipe, Santa Ana, Zia, Jemez, Sandia, Isleta, Laguna, Acoma, and
Zuni).
" Interview with the Honorable William Bluehouse Johnson, Laguna Tribal Court Judge
(Mar. 24, 1994). A Suquamish appellate court decision documents the use of the Tribe's criminal
code in an incident involving domestic violence, for which the defendant was charged and
convicted of assault and battery by the Tribal Court. The defendant was jailed for 15 days, fined
$120, ordered to perform 30 days of supervised community service and ordered to anger-
management counseling with the Suquamish Tribal Social Services Department for one year.
Suquamish Indian Tribe v. Mills, Sr., 21 Indian L. Rep. 6053 (Suquamish Tribal Court of
Appeals 1991).
25 See PASCUA-YAQUI TRIB. CODE ch.11, §§ 11-1101 to -1103 (1992); JICARILLA APACHE
TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, §§ 1-12 (1992); ZUNI TRIBE, ORDINANCE No. 52 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CODE (1991); STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, §§ 25-101-25-116
(1990); OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2, §§ 1-23 (1982).
25, NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, §§ 1601-1667 (1993); Protection from Domestic Abuse Act,
CHEROKEE NATION CODE tit. 22, §§ 60-60.7 (1990).
25 See MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE No. 93-21, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1993); CROW
TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODES §§ 1-10 (1991);
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under the civil law of the tribe.
1. Criminal
The purpose of this Chapter is to recognize domestic abuse as a
serious crime against our society and to assure the victim of domestic
abuse the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who
enforce the law can provide."3
Many tribal domestic abuse provisions include criminal sanctions and
provide for arrest of those persons committing certain acts of domestic
abuse. 4 Both mandatory and discretionary arrest provisions are com-
mon. Those tribes with mandatory arrest provisions for the commission of
certain acts of domestic abuse or violation of orders of protection include:
Oglala, Jicarilla, Crow, Fort Belknap, Salt River Pima-Maricopa, Pascua-
Yaqui, Zuni, Standing Rock, Rosebud, and Menominee." Even the
FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (1989); ROSEBUD Sioux TRIB. CODE
ch. 38, §§ 1-10 (1989).
21 ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIB. CODE ch. 38, (Purpose) (1989).
2 See, e.g., FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Mandatory Arrest
Provision) (1989). The U.S. government, however, has affected tribal criminal authority over
non-Indians, non-member Indians and member Indians. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978). The Supreme Court ruled that the tribe did not have criminal jurisdiction
to prosecute a non-Indian for a criminal act committed within the tribe's jurisdiction absent
congressional delegation. Id. at 210. In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Supreme Court
ruled that the tribal court could not prosecute a non-member Indian for criminal acts committed
on tribal land. Id. at 688 ("In the area of criminal enforcement, however, tribal power does not
extend beyond internal relations among members."). In addition, the Federal government has
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over Indians involving fourteen crimes. See Indian Major Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1994). Whether this jurisdiction is exclusive
to the federal government has not been decided; however, several tribes exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over the criminal offenses listed in the Indian Major Crimes Act. Congress restored
the tribes' ability to prosecute member Indians in October 1991. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994).
Tribes, however, continue to be prohibited from prosecuting non-Indians by the Oliphant
decision. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191. Thus, tribal criminal provisions on domestic violence
are unenforceable against non-Indian offenders. See NAVAO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 151(a)(5)
(1993) (stating that criminal penalties apply only to those persons over which Navajo Nation has
criminal jurisdiction). But see Taylor, supra note 98, at 247 n.80 (explaining that authority of
Courts of Federal Regulations to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is undecided
issue). In addition, tribes are limited in the sanctions they may impose for criminal offenses as
a result of the Indian Civil Rights Act. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994). Tribes can only impose
sentences of up to one year and/or a $5000 fine for any one offense. Id. § 1302(7). However.
the existence of both civil and criminal remedies for domestic abuse allows tribes to deal in some
way with all the people in their jurisdiction.
25- MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE No. 93-21 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE § IV (1993):
JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 4 (1992); PASCUA-YAQUI TRIB. CODE ch. 11
§ 11-1102 (1992); CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE
CODES § 4 (1991); ZUNI TRIBE, ORDINANCE No. 52 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Arrest Without
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Navajo Nation, which has a civil domestic abuse code, provides for the
mandatory arrest of persons who violate domestic abuse protection
orders.2 6
Under some of these tribal codes, a mandatory cooling-off period of
12 to 72 hours or a holding period follows the mandatory arrest. 7 In
tribal communities, mandatory arrest serves the same purpose as in other
non-Indian communities: protection of the victim's safety." The plain
language in many provisions makes it clear that the arrest is intended to
serve as a cooling-off period.259 It also serves as a period during which
the abuser can regain his sobriety given the high correlation between
alcohol and criminal arrests on tribal lands.' ° Nearly all tribal codes that
allow for mandatory arrest also permit a police officer to file a complaint
or an arrest report with the prosecutor for further action. 6 The victim
is generally not required or file or to agree to the filing of a complaint. 2
Warrant) (1991); STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-104 (1990);
FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Mandatory Arrest Provision) (1989);
ROSEBUD Sioux TRIB. CODE ch. 38, § 3 (1989); SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA, Dep't of Pub.
Safety, General Order No. 89-25 (Mar. 23, 1988); OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE see. 99.2, § 3
(1982).
256 NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 1663(a)(2) (1993).
57 See, e.g., JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 4(H) (1992) (not less than 12
hours); STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV § 25-105 (1990) (not to exceed
72 hours); see also MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE No. 93-21 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE § VI(A)
(1993) (not to exceed 36 hours, excluding Saturday, Sunday and official holidays or unless held
over by order of commitment), CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES,
DOMESTIC ABUSE CODES § 5 (1991) (held without bail until arraignment).
21 See, e.g., MENOMINEE TRIB. ORDINANCE No. 93-21, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE § VI (B)
(1993) (providing for release only if jailed party agrees to apply for and comply with restraining
order).
2_1 See, e.g., JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, §§ 4-5 (1992).
m The Tender Hearts Against Family Violence, Inc., a crisis intervention program on the
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation reported the following statistics: for the period October 1, 1989
to September 30, 1990 and October 1, 1990 to September 30, 1991, 95 % of all violence towards
victims was alcohol-related. Tender Hearts Against Family Violence, Inc., Statistics For Tender
Hearts Program 1 (1992) (on file with St. John's Law Review). For the period October 1. 1991
to September 30, 1992, 95% of all violence toward victims treated by the program was alcohol-
related. Id. Tender Hearts also reported that from the time that bars on the reservation were
closed in December, 1991, a decrease in violence resulted, Id. at 4 (A). Statistics compiled by
the Networking Office of the Council on Abused Women's Services for the North Dakota State
Health Department show alcohol was used by the abuser in 43 % of domestic violence incidents,
and by both partners in 16% of the incidents. Id. at 10.
2' See, e.g., STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-105 (1990)
(providing that law enforcement officer making arrest must file complaint against offender on
behalf of tribe); FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Filing a Complaint)
(a) (1989) (requiring arresting officer to sign complaint on behalf of community).
2 MENOMINEE TRIB. ORDINANCE No. 93-21, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE § V (A) (1993) (police
officer reports to prosecutor); JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 4(E) (1992) (police
19951
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:69
Mandatory arrest is not without its unique problems in tribal
communities. Incarceration has never been a traditional method of
punishment in Indian societies.263 In this respect, mandatory arrest and
incarceration are serious measures as well as reminders of the loss or
breakdown of traditional constraints on tribal societal behavior. In 1883,
incarceration was introduced into tribal societies by the federal government
with the advent of Courts of Indian Offenses and Indian police.26 While
incarceration has been present in some tribes for at least one hundred
years, inadequate jail facilities pose problems.26  Many tribes do not
have jail facilities, and must utilize other tribal or state facilities, at high
costs. The utilization of non-tribal jail facilities can also require distant
trips for law enforcement and family members.
In addition, some tribal community activists challenge mandatory
arrest provisions as violative of the rights of alleged abusers, including the
officer files complaint); CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC
ABUSE CODE §§ 4(a), (d) (1981) (police officer informs police captain and prosecutor); STANDING
ROCK Sioux TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-106 (A) (1990) (law enforcement officer
signs complaint); FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Filing a Complaint)
(a) (1989) (indicating complaint is considered filed on behalf of community, notwithstanding
victim's wishes); SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA, Dep't of Pub. Safety, General Order No. 89-25,
4 (Mar. 23, 1988). Some tribes do not grant the victim discretion to withdraw the complaint
by judicial or prosecutorial policy. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Chad Smith, Attorney
General of the Cherokee Nation (Oklahoma) (Mar. 21, 1994) (stating that as prosecutor, he
refuses to dismiss charges even if spouses have reconsidered). Attorney General Smith and Chief
Judge William Bluehouse Johnson of the Laguna Pueblo Tribal Court both adopt the position that
a tribal interest is at issue, requiring prosecution to follow. See id.; see also Telephone Interview
with William Bluehouse Johnson, Chief Judge of the Laguna Pueblo Tribal Court (Mar. 23,
1994). Smith and Johnson both say that they do not agree to probation or remedies that simply
allow the abuser to apologize and reconcile with the victim. Attorney General Smith also requires
abusers to undergo mandatory counseling, especially when children have observed or experienced
the abuse. Telephone Interview with Chad Smith, Attorney General of the Cherokee Nation
(Oklahoma) (Mar. 21, 1994); see also STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV,
§ 25-116(B) (providing that counseling include children of both defendant and victim when there
is evidence of pattern of abuse). Smith also says the Cherokee Nation and the State of Oklahoma
have an agreement to enforce each other's orders so that abusers cannot seek to escape what is
necessary to change future behavior. CHEROKEE NATION CODE tit. 22, § 60.7 (1990).
2 See generally ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 36-37 (3d ed. 1991) (regarding CIO/CRF Courts as response to Ex parte Crow Dog,
109 U.S. 556 (1883)). In Crow Dog, the Court denied authority to try and punish an Indian for
the murder of another Indian because tribes retained their self-government power absent explicit
renunciation by the tribe or removal of the power by Congress. Id. at 572.
2 See INDIAN BUREAU, REGULATIONS OF THE INDIAN DEPARTMENT 71-88 (1884) (stating
regulations of Court of Indian Offenses).
I See generally Tim Vollman, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 22 KAN. L. REV.
387 (1974) (noting that tribal governments often lack resources to punish crimes over which they
have jurisdiction).
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presumption of innocence until guilt is proven.2' As in the non-Indian
world, there is concern that the mandatory arrest provision will be abused
by women who employ it against their spouse without sufficient
grounds. 7 Despite these couhtervailing factors, a significant number of
tribes include mandatory arrest provisions in their laws addressing domestic
violence in their communities. 268
Once a defendant is found guilty, the tribal code provisions generally
provide for incarceration, fines, probation, or counseling. 9 The Jicarilla
and Oglala codes, for example, provide that a court may require chemical
dependency evaluations if alcohol or drugs are a factor in a particular
case.27 The Menominee, Jicarilla, and Oglala require that the defendant
participate in a domestic violence program." The Jicarilla and the
Oglala also require the counselor, domestic violence program, or other
service provider to make reports to the court; sanctions against the
perpetrator are provided for failure to comply with a court order requiring
counseling, treatment, or participation in a program.2'
In terms of sentencing, Pascua-Yaqui law specifically allows probation
for a first offense and dismissal of the charge if probation is successfully
completed.273 The Pascua-Yaqui court also may require a defendant to pay
restitution and undergo counseling.274 The Oglala Sioux allow for the
26 Avis Little Eagle, Mandatory Arrest Ordinance Puts Pressure on Oglala Court Systems,
LAKOTA TIMES, Nov. 27, 1990, at A8 [hereinafter Little Eagle, Mandatory Arrests] (containing
comment by Robert Grey Eagle, former Dakota Plains Legal Aid Attorney, concerning Oglala
Sioux Tribe's Domestic Abuse Code).
See Little Eagle, Pros and Cons, supra note 165, at A10.
See supra note 255 and accompanying text (listing tribal laws providing mandatory arrest
provisions).
29 See, e.g., JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 5(D)(4) (1992) (providing court
discretion to order treatment in lieu of fine): STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit.
XXV, § 9 (1990) (providing for minimum sentence for first offender of ten days).
270 See JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 5(C) (1992); OGLALA SIOUX TRIB.
CODE Sec. 99.2, § 4(f) (1982); See also MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE No. 93-21 § VII (A)
(1993) (requiring alcohol and other drug abuse assessment of all persons convicted of crime in
domestic violence situation, as well as completion of Domestic Violence/Abuse Treatment
Program).
"I See MENOMINEE TRIBAL LEGISLATURE, Ord. No. 93-21, § VII(A) (requiring completion
of Domestic Violence/Abuse Treatment Program).
27P See JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 5(D) (1992); OGLALA SIOUX TRIB.
CODE See. 99.2, § 4(g) (1982).
213 PASCUA-YAQUI TRIB. CODE ch. 11, § 11-1102(G) states: "The terms and conditions of
probation shall include those necessary to provide for the protection of the alleged victim and
other specifically designated persons .. .
214 Id.
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suspension of a jail sentence for a first offense.275
Most tribes that will provide criminal sanctions, however, set
minimum jail sentences ranging from 10 days to 30 days to a maximum
sentence of 6 months for a first offense. 76 For a second offense, tribes
require minimum jail sentences ranging from 10 to 90 days with a
maximum of 6 months. 77 For a third or subsequent offense, the Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation requires a 6-month minimum sentence,278
while the Rosebud Sioux Code mandates a minimum of 30 days.? 9
Many tribes require a $500 maximum fine, and in addition to imprison-
ment, provide counseling for substance abuse, anger control, and domestic
relations. 2' Also, both the Fort Belknap Indian Community and the
2'5 See OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2, § 4(e) (1982). Sentences are to be for 30 to
60 days. When a sentence is suspended the defendant must cooperate completely with the orders
of the court requiring cooperation with the domestic violence program. Id.
276 MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE No. 93-21, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1993) § VII
(providing separate criminal penalties); PASCUA-YAQUI TRIB. CODE ch. 11, § 11-1102(F) (1992)
(offenses classified in criminal code); JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3. ch. 5, § 3(A) (1992)
(providing incarceration not to exceed six months but no minimum sentence); CROW TRIBE OF
INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE § 5(c) (1991) (10 days to 180
days); ZUNI TRIBE, ORDINANCE No. 52 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CODE (1991) (indicating domestic
violence as Class C offense); STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-
116(A) (1990) (imposing sentences of 10 to 90 days); FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION,
DOMESTIC ABUSE (Penalties) (a) (1989) (30 days to 180 days); ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIB. CODE ch.
38, § 9(A) (1989) (indicating 10 to 180 days); OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2, § 4(e)
(imposing 30 to 60 days for a first offense which can be suspended).
277 MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE No. 93-21 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1993) § VII
(providing separate criminal penalties); JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 3(A)
(1992) (providing incarceration not to exceed 6 months but no minimum sentence); PASCUA-
YAQUI TRIB. CODE ch. 11, § 11-1102(F) (1992) (offenses classified in criminal code); CROW
TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE § 5(d) (1991) (30
days minimum); ZUNI TRIBE, ORDINANCE No. 52 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CODE (1991) (indicating
domestic violence as Class C offense); STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV,
§ 25-116(A) (1990) (imposing sentences of 10 to 90 days); FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION,
DOMESTIC ABUSE (Penalties) (b) (1989) (90 days to 180 days); ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIB. CODE ch.
38, § 9(A) (1989) (indicating 10 to 180 days); OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2. § 4(e)
(imposing 30 to 60 days for a first offense which can be suspended).
278 FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Penalties) (c) (providing 180
days minimum and maximum sentence).
279 ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIB. CODE ch. 38, § 9(B) (establishing 30 days to 180 days).
2$ JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 3(A) (1992) (maximum $500 fine and
domestic violence treatment); PASCUA-YAQUI TRIB. CODE ch. 11. § 11-1102(G) (1992)
(imposition of fine, counselling and diversionary programs in conjunction with probation); CROW
TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE §§ 5(c)-(d) (1991)
($500 maximum fine and mandatory counseling); STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE
tit. XXV, § 25-116 (1990) ($500 maximum fine and mandatory counseling); FORT BELKNAP
INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Penalties) (a)-(c) (1989) ($500 fine maximum and
mandatory counseling); ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIB. CODE ch. 38, § 9 (1989) (maximum $500 fine and
mandatory counseling).
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Rosebud Sioux Tribe provide counseling by a medicine man recognized in
the community by those persons who practice traditional Indian reli-
gion.28'
The importance of allowing counseling by traditional or professionally
trained counselors from within the Indian community cannot be overstated.
The counselors approach issues from a cultural and traditional perspective
with an understanding of the impact that contact with Western culture has
had on the roles of tribal men and women. Utilizing these counselors
affirms native people in their own culture and provides a basis for
confronting the problem from a tribal perspective.' Putting domestic
violence in the proper cultural perspective is critical in Indian communi-
ties.m Accomplishing this goal requires a general knowledge of histori-
cal events regarding Indian people as well as specific knowledge of a
tribe's history.' It also necessitates a familiarity with a specific tribe's
traditional concepts of male/female relations and counseling skills.'
Tradition and culture can play a role in modifying behavior to the extent
that either traditional or trained counselors in the community can provide
information to reinforce both victims and abusers with an understanding of
traditional values and traditional male/female relations. Using tradition to
approach contemporary issues in Indian society is what many call
"retraditionalization. 6
It is also important that the needs of both abusers and victims be
28 FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, DOMESTIC ABUSE (Penalties) (a)-(c) (1989);
ROSEBUD Sioux TRIB. CODE ch. 38, § 9 (1989).
- A study conducted by the Native American Women's Health Resource Center illustrates
the direct impact outside influences have had on some of the problems experienced within the
Indian family. The Resource Center, located on the Yankton Sioux Reservation in Lake Andes,
S.D., is an organization which works on domestic violence issues and counsels families dealing
with abuse. A group of Indian families being treated at the Resource Center participated in a
generation-tracking study to understand the roots of sexual assault in each family. In every one
of the participating families, the first generation experienced sexual assault as a young student
attending a boarding school. The perpetrator in most cases was a priest, but in one case it was
a nun. Asetoyer, supra note 4, at 1-2.
'3 See generally Foundation GrantLeads Assaulton PineRidgeDomestic Violence, LAKOTA
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1989, at 7 [hereinafter Assault on Pine Ridge]. Marlin Mousseau, project
coordinator of the Oglala Sioux Cantokicignakapi [Loving One Another] project, made the
following statement: "[it is essential that any programs addressing issues of violence in Indian
Country utilize culture as a foundation for reteaching traditional values." Id.
See generally id. (stressing strengths of reteaching traditional values through Oglala
Sioux's own culture).
I See generally Teresa LaFromboise et al., Changing and Diverse Roles of Women in
American Indian Cultures, 22 SEX ROLES 455 (1990) (examining traditional and contemporary
roles of American Indian women).
1 See id. at 468.
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addressed because of the relational structure of Indian tribes."s In tribal
societies, men, women, and children are related not only to one another,
but to the larger community. In this respect, tribes differ from small town
and city populations. This approach is of tremendous value, whether tribes
utilize peacemakers, medicine people, sponsors, or other persons to provide
a traditional approach to contemporary problems.
2. Civil
Tribal codes also provide civil remedies and sanctions to curb
domestic violence. The majority of tribal codes allow for the issuance of
protective orders on an emergency basis, regardless of whether the codes
permit only civil remedies or both criminal and civil remedies." The
Jicarilla Code allows a court to issue a temporary order of protection as a
condition of release of the defendant when the defendant is before the court
after mandatory arrest.289  This court can issue the temporary orders at
its own discretion, without an application to the court for a civil protection
order.2' Under the Jicarilla Code, an order of protection can provide for
the temporary exclusion of the defendant from the residence and for
restricted contact with the victim. 91 The Menominee Ordinance contains
an interesting provision regarding orders of protection. It provides that a
jailed party can be released if the accused agrees to apply for and comply
with a judge's order prohibiting any interference with the other party.2
Significantly, the Oglala Code maintains that when there is an
allegation of an imminent and present danger, a standing order of
protection will exist pending a full hearing.293 The order may restrain
acts of domestic abuse, exclude the abusing party from a shared residence,
and prohibit contact with the victim.2 The Jicarilla and Standing Rock
Sioux Codes also permit the issuance of a temporary restraining order
" See Assault on Pine Ridge, supra note 283, at 7. ("Domestic violence is not Lakota
tradition ..... We will not end violence in our communities by continuing to provide services
only to victims. The situation will continue until perpetrators of violence receive treatment.").
I See infra notes 290-99.
2'9 JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 5(A) (1992).
290 Id.
-1 Id. § 6(1)-(3) (1992).
292 MENOMINEE NATION, ORDINANCE No. 93-21, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE § VI (B) (1993). A
hearing before a trial judge is held within 10 days, and the restraining order is in effect until
vacated or modified. A permanent restraining order may be issued for a period of time not to
exceed five years. Id.
293 OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2, § 8(a)(1) (1982).
294 Id. § 8(a)(2).
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under similar conditions.295 Most other tribes allow for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order without further hearing if, upon the court's
review of the pleadings and evidence, there is reasonable cause to believe
that an act of domestic violence may be or has been committed. 96
Most temporary protection orders grant limited relief to the victims of
domestic violence. This relief includes: restraining the abusing party from
acts of domestic abuse; excluding the abusing party from a shared
residence; restraining contact with the victim; restricting proximity to the
victim; awarding temporary custody; and establishing temporary visitation
of minor children.2' Upon award of a final restraining order, some
tribes provide for counseling, give temporary use and possession of
property to the victim, require an accounting for all transfers made after
the order is entered, mandate payment of rent and child support, and allow
any other relief necessary. 9
295 JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 6(b)(2) (1992); STANDING ROCK SIOUX
TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-109(A) (1990).
2,. Navajo Nation Domestic Abuse Protection Act, NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 1655 (1993)
(allowing for issuance of ex parte temporary protection orders based on evidence proving
emergency situation); PASCUA-YAQUI TRIB. CODE ch. 11, § 11-1103(F) (1992); CHEROKEE
NATION CODE tit. 22, §§ 60.2 - 60.4 (1990) (allowing for issuance of emergency ex parte orders
for good cause shown at ex parte hearing held same day petition is filed).
97 See NAVAJO TRm. CODE tit. 9, § 1660(a) (1993) (restraining aggressor from acts of
domestic abuse, excluding aggressor from residence, restraining aggressor's contact with victim,
awarding temporary custody of children, awarding possession of personal property, providing for
nondisposition of property, ordering law enforcement supervision of return to residence, and
granting other relief); JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 6(C) (1992) (providing
court with power to exclude abusing party from dwelling, restrain contact with victim, restrain
respondent from committing further acts of domestic violence, award temporary custody or
establish temporary visitation rights, provide child support and temporary support, order
temporary guardianship, award temporary use and possession of property of respondent, restrain
party(ies) from affecting property, order payment of debts, supersede prior orders of court
relating to domestic matters, and provide any other lawful relief deemed necessary for protection
of claimed or potential victims); PASCUA-YAQUI TRIB. CODE ch. 11, § 11-1103 (1992)
(restraining party from further acts of domestic violence, excluding one party from home,
restricting party contact); CHEROKEE NATION CODE tit. 22, § 60.3 (1990) (excluding abusing
party from dwelling, restraining abusing party from further acts of violence or interference with
victim, restraining abusing party from contact with victim); STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIB. CODE
OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-109(B)(1)-(3) (1990) (restraining abusing party from acts of domestic
abuse, excluding abusing party from residence, awarding temporary custody of children,
restricting or supervising visitation of minor children).
I In addition to the protections afforded under a standing order for protection, the Oglala
domestic violence law provides temporary visitation with minor children, counseling and social
services, treatment or counseling for the abusing party, temporary use of property, prevention
of parties from disposing of property, and other relief necessary for protection of family and
household members, including orders which direct the public safety division of the tribe.
OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE see. 99.2, § 7 (1982). The Navajo Nation provides for counseling,
temporary use and possession of property, prevention of both parties from affecting property,
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E. Reporting
Telling
Her face is wide, innocent, clear.
She tells me things.
They are secrets. "He did this to me. He told me not to tell. I never
told until now."
Her face twists for an instant,
then returns to its rightful beauty.
I listen.
She doesn't cry, but my eyes feel the familiar moisture seeping out,
dropping on my hand that holds her's. How dare these tears appear when
she - who has the courage to tell - doesn't weep.
She gives me this.
Secrets.
Beth Brant (Mohawk)299
Four tribes have provisions in their codes requiring mandatory
reporting of possible domestic violence." ° All four require reporting by
medical personnel, such as physicians, nurses, and community health
workers.3"' Moreover, the Oglala and Crow Codes require physician
assistants, hospital interns, residents, field health nurses, and dentists to file
a report when they suspect domestic abuse.3" Additionally, the Standing
Rock and Jicarilla Codes require mental health workers to report domestic
payment of rent and mortgages, payment for alternative housing, child support, court costs and
other relief including those listed as available under temporary orders. NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit.
9, § 1660(a) (1993). The Cherokee court can award attorney's fees and court costs in a final
protective order in addition to the protections available under an emergency ex parte order.
CHEROKEE NATION CODE tit. 22, § 60.4(D) (1990); see also STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIB. CODE
OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-108(D) (1990) (allowing court to recommend or require party(ies) to
obtain counseling from domestic abuse program or another agency, order support, and award
temporary use of property).
299 RETURNING THE GIFT: POETRY & PROSE FROM THE FIRST NORTH AMERICAN NATIVE
WRITERS' FESTIVAL 50 (1994).
300 JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 12 (1992); CROW TRIB. OF INDIANS,
CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE §§ 6-9 (1991); STANDING ROCK SIOUX
TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-111 (1990); OGLALA SIOUX TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2,
§§ 15-20 (1982).
30' JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 12(A) (1992); CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS,
CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE § 7 (1991): STANDING ROCK SIOUX
TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-110(A) (1990); OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE Sec. 99.2,
§ 16 (1982).
302 CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE § 6
(1991); OGLALA Sioux TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2, § 15 (1982).
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abuse. 03 Outside of the medical profession, the Jicarilla Code mandates
that school teachers, social workers, and probation officers report domestic
abuse. The Standing Rock Code requires social workers, counselors, and
personnel of domestic violence programs and shelters to report suspected
situations of domestic abuse.3 4 The Oglala and Crow Codes additionally
require social workers, parent aides, adult service workers, law enforce-
ment officers, court workers, alcohol program workers, and domestic
violence personnel to report domestic abuse.3 5 Under Oglala, Jicarilla,
and Crow Law, the failure to report domestic abuse is a criminal
offense.306
F Codes Generally
We want none of your laws or customs that we have not willingly
adopted for ourselves. We have adopted many. You have adopted some
of ours-votes for women for instance-we are as well behaved as you
and you would think so if you knew us better.
Edward Ahenakew, Cree, 19201
There is often a difference between what the law provides and what
is actually implemented. This is as true in Indian communities as it is in
non-Indian communities. Therefore, the existence of a domestic abuse
code does not necessarily mean that all aspects of the code function as the
written law mandates. 0 s This is often the result of uneven enforcement
and the lack of resources within a tribal community, and/or the effective-
ness of those resources.0 9 This review of the domestic abuse codes of
M3 JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 12(A) (1992); STANDING ROCK SIOUX
TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-110(A) (1990).
' STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-110 (1990).
30 JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 12 (1992); CROW TRIB. OF INDIANS,
CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE §§ 6-9 (1991); STANDING ROCK SIOUX
TRIB. CODE OF JUSTICE tit. XXV, § 25-111 (1990); OGLALA SIOUX TRIB. CODE sec. 99.2,
§§ 15-20 (1982).
'M JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 3, ch. 5, § 12(E) (1992); CROW TRIB. OF INDIANS,
CROW LAW AND ORDER CODES, DOMESTIC ABUSE CODE § 6 (1991); OGLALA SIOUX TRIB.
CODE sec. 99.2, § 15 (1982).
WORDS OF POWER, VOICES FROM INDIAN AMERICA 36 (Norbert S. Hill, Jr. ed., 1994).
z See Little Eagle, Mandatory Arrest, supra note 266, at A8. Project Medicine Wheel, a
program that counsels abusers and refers victims to shelters and services, found that the Oglala
Sioux Tribal courts were not following up on sentences for domestic abuse violations. Judges,
in turn, charged that the code is contradictory to existing code provisions and was not provided
to the court, and that the system's lack of probationary services hinders the implementation of the
code. Id.; see also Little Eagle, Pros and Cons, supra note 165, at A10 (expressing concerns
about application of Oglala code).
31 Little Eagle, Pros and Cons, supra note 165, at A10.
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tribal communities is only a part of the picture. Another part of the picture
comes from a look at the actual impact being made in these communities.
It is important to reflect on what the codes themselves reveal, before we
address intervention work at the community level.
In certain respects, the codes reflect the tribal influence as it is
represented by the many references to the extended family, the allowances
for restitution, and counseling by medicine people. ° In other ways, the
codes directly incorporate tribal thought, such as in the policy, finding, and
purpose sections of the Navajo code.311
Mostly, the tribal codes evidence the incorporation and influence of
western jurisprudence. Perhaps this is inevitable in light of the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA),312 and the tendency of tribes to look at both state and
other tribal codes for guidance when developing their particular code.313
When tribes develop laws to deal with areas of such critical social concern
as domestic abuse, careful deliberation is required when outside laws and
procedures are considered 4.31  Equal consideration should be given to
indigenous concepts of law and to traditional methods of dispute resolution
when developing tribal law.3"5 ICRA standards notwithstanding, tribes
can infuse their law with principles and methods which reflect their values,
precepts, and approaches to dispute resolution in far greater ways than
present codes currently reflect.31 6
G. Implementation of Orders and Intervention
Life goes on
310 See, e.g. Navajo Nation Domestic Abuse Protection Act, NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9,
§ 1602 (1993) (outlining general policy of Navajo nation and concern for effects of violence on
entire Navajo family and clan); ROSEBUD Sioux TRIB. CODE ch. 38, § 9(a) (1989) (providing for
counseling by medicine man for those practicing traditional Indian religion).
31" NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 1602 (1993) (stating that Navajo policy is to demonstrate
respect for Navajo family and clan). The purpose section reads, "[tihe purpose of this Act is to
protect all persons; men, women, children, elders, disabled persons, and other vulnerable
persons, who are within the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation, from all forms of domestic abuse
as defined by this Act and by Navajo Nation law." Id. § 1604.
31 Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994) (imposing requirements
upon tribal governments to meet minimum standards of due process as imposed on state and
federal government by United States Constitution's Bill of Rights).
a3a See Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 416 (stating that Navajo domestic violence court rules
are based partially upon Anglo-American common law).
3,4 See id. at 415-16.
a Id. at 423-24.
316 See Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, Conference Paper Presented to
Indigenous Justice Conference: Justice Based on Indian Concepts (Dec. 8-9, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the St. John's Law Review).
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no matter
no matter
what we do
what we do
have to get past
these rough waters
she's going through. 7
The stage when a court implements orders and intervention occurs is
the most critical point in the entire dispute resolution process. To
successfully address domestic abuse in Indian communities, the needs of
both the abused and the abuser require attention. Both parties need insight
into their behavior and must take action to foster change based on this
insight.318  Typically, "needs" are met as a result of intervention.
Intervention may occur as the result of a court order or through informal
methods, such as through a person's self-referral to a counselor or through
traditional dispute resolution.
A list of grantees of federal assistance for victims of federal crimes in
Indian country319 reveals that thirty-seven tribes received funds in 1994
to provide assistance for victims of domestic violence.32 These recipi-
ents include the Native Indian Crisis Association (NICA) Domestic Abuse
Shelter run by the Blackfeet of Montana. The primary purpose of this
program is to provide shelter for abused victims and their children.
Victims residing at the shelter are provided transportation, legal advocacy,
3t7 TRUDELL & SHARK, supra note 139.
318 See generally POWER & CONTROL: TACTICS OF MEN WHO BATTER 16 (Domestic Abuse
Intervention Project ed.).
311 See Victim of Crime Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.§§ 10601-10603 (1994) (providing fund to
compensate victims of crime).
320 See NATIONAL INDIAN JUSTICE CENTER, INC., ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS OF FEDERAL
CRIME IN INDIAN COUNTRY: STATE AND SUBGRANTEE AWARD LIST (FISCAL YEAR 1993 &
1994). The grantees are: White Mountain Apache Tribal Guidance Center; Navajo Nation Victim
Witness Program; Gila River Indian Community Tribal Social Services; Nez Perce Tribe Victim's
Assistance Project; Shoshone/Bannock Victims of Crime Services; Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas; Lac
Vieux Desert Indian Reservation; Bay Mills Indian Reservation; Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians; Native Indian Crisis Association Domestic Abuse Shelter; Crow Victim Assistance
Program; Fort Peck Tribe; Walker River Paiute Tribe; Reno-Sparks Indian Colony; Ely Shoshone
Tribe; Eight Northern Indian Pueblos Council; Pueblo of Zuni; Jicarilla Apache; Pueblo of
Laguna; Fort Berthold Coalition Against Domestic Violence; Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa
Indians; Tender Hearts, Inc.; Miami Tribe; Tonkawa Tribe; The Confederated Tribes of Warm
Springs; Red Horse Lodge; Victims of Crime Assistance Pine Ridge Reservation/Oglala Sioux;
Women's Circle Support Services; Ute Indian Tribe; Lunmi Victims of Crime; South Puget
Intertribal Planning Agency (SPIPA); Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, Menominee Tribal
Police Department, Crime Victims Office; American Indian Justice Center, Ft. Washakie,
Wyoming.
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counseling, and assistance in locating permanent safe housing. The tribe
provided an alternate home for the project while the house, which opened
in May of 1990, was undergoing renovation. Previously, the nearest
available shelter had been located 130 miles away. A counselor staffs the
program and provides group and individual counseling on education and
job skills. There is also a victim advocate/house parent who provides
support, advocacy, and assistance to victims.32" '
Another example is Tender Hearts Against Family Violence, Inc., a
program which began in 1988 with Victims of Crime Assistance funding.
Located in Fort Yates, North Dakota, the program is seeking to set up a
satellite office in McLauglin, South Dakota, for those victims who reside
on the South Dakota side of the Standing Rock Reservation. The
Reservation straddles the boundaries of the two states. The Tender Hearts
program is a crisis-intervention program and works in conjunction with
other tribal, state, and IHS resources. The program has support groups for
men and women with most of the participants attending as a result of a
court-order. The program assisted in the effort to enact the Standing Rock
Domestic Abuse Code. For the years 1991 and 1992, Tender Hearts found
that 95% of domestic abuse victims were women. 3" A total of 211 cases
of domestic violence were prosecuted through Standing Rock Tribal Court
from October 1990 to September 1991. 32
The Sacred Shawl Society is an example of an intervention program
which provides a cultural context in which to deal with domestic violence.
This approach is, at once, comforting and challenging to Indian people.
Sacred Shawl is located in Pine Ridge Village on the Oglala Sioux
reservation, with a reservation-wide network of counselors and safe-
houses.324 The Society provides services such as family and victim
counseling, legal assistance, emergency shelter, transportation, and limited
financial assistance.3' Sacred Shawl receives no federal or tribal funds,
but it receives grant assistance and benefits from grassroots fund raising.
The Society's work revealed that the general public, the court system,
the abuser, the children, and the victims were living in ignorance of Lakota
values regarding domestic violence. 6 As a result, the Society began to
provide education regarding Lakota thought and philosophy on domestic
321 Id.
31 Tender Hearts Against Violence, Inc., Statistics for Tender Hearts Program 1-2 (1992)
(providing statistics from Oct. 1, 1989 to Sept. 30, 1992) (on file with St. John's Law Review).
323 id.
32 Plume, supra note 2, at 67.
325 Id.
32 Id. at 72.
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violence. In her article on the work of the Society, Debra White Plume
describes the pre-reservation Lakota philosophy regarding spousal abuse,
the role of adult men and women in pre-reservation society, and the Lakota
values and social law regarding wife battering using Lakota words.327
Plume explains the concept of tiyospaye - relatives living together in unity
and cooperation, which is based on people living together according to the
same beliefs, laws, and values.3" She describes how the Lakota society
has been affected by the dissolution of traditional ways.329 Traditionally,
wife battering was neither accepted nor tolerated. Spousal abuse, however,
emerged as the result of the disintegration of Lakota ways of life and with
the introduction of alcohol into the society.330
The Sacred Shawl Society's approach to domestic violence first
involves articulating the traditional concepts of Indian society relative to the
relationship between men and women. Further, the present relationship
between men and women in tribal society is examined against the backdrop
of these traditional concepts. An important aspect appears to be an
examination of the treatment of domestic violence in the society before
outside influences affected the concepts. Contemporary tribal societies face
problems because of the disruption of the roles of men and women, the
displacement of traditional values, and the introduction of countervailing
and contrary values.33" ' This culture-oriented approach plays a role in any
action taken by tribal communities to address domestic values. In tribal
communities, both the abused and the abuser can gain from this knowledge.
The use of community members in intervention and counseling
programs can result in the development of counseling methods which draw
on the strengths of the culture. Developing a domestic abuse approach
premised on the Indian value of harmony within a community ensures that
the needs of the direct and indirect victims of violence, as well as the
perpetrator, will be considered. Indian societies are based on different
values and beliefs than other societies. Borrowing an individualistic
approach focusing on the victim from outside tribal society only adds to the
conflict.
3 Id. at 68-71.
12 Id. at 71.
311 Plume, supra note 2, at 72.
3 Id.; see also Pommersheim, supra note 62, at 438-39 (discussing implications of laws on
tradition and culture of tribal life); cf Zion & Zion, supra note 1, at 408.
3' See Plume, supra note 2, at 72.
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IV. INDIANS OUTSIDE THE TRIBAL SYSTEM
When I first came into a shelter in the city, I felt confused. I tried
to explain my feelings but nobody understood. . . . I couldn't just go and
do what they asked of me. . . . I didn't have a phone. I had no
neighbors. Abuse on the reserve can be very hidden.33
2
We have focused on tribal laws and systems, but we must also
consider the large urban Indian population.333 Generally, a large part of
the urban Indian population maintains ties with the reservation, by moving
between the reservation and urban areas. The urban centers, however, are
increasingly becoming permanent homes to a large number of Indian
people.
For this reason, it is important to consider the needs of the urban
population. For those who maintain close ties to the reservation, tribal
resources remain available. Urban Indians are no less Indian than Indian
people who reside on the reservation. Thus, state judges and service
providers must be aware of the need for approaches to domestic violence
which consider the cultural needs of Indian people. The need for
approaches to domestic violence which take culture into consideration is
just as great among urban Indian families as it is at the tribal level.
Indian women and other women of color confront the same cultural
insensitivity and racism at urban domestic violence shelters as they do
elsewhere. 334  These shelters can be unaware of the cultural resources
which should be used to assist Indian victims of domestic violence.335
332 Eva Ferguson, Out from the Shadows: Native Women Find Haven From Abuse at New
Shelter, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 11, 1993, at B1 (comments of Marilyn Fraser-King, vice-
president of board for new shelter for native women in northwest Calgary, Alberta).
... The total population of American Indian, Eskimo or Aleut persons is 2,015.143. BUREAU
OF CENSUS 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS. UNITED
STATES tbl. 1. 768,135 Native Americans live in urban areas. Id. at tbl. 4.
11 Pat Prince, Vision Becomes Reality, Shelter for Battered Indian Women to Open in St.
Paul, STAR TRIB., June 1, 1991, at 1B: "Women of color end up having to choose between
going to the white community to feel safe from battering and going to their own community to
be safe from racism." Id. (comments of Marsha Frey, director of Minnesota Coalition for
Battered Women). Canadian Indian women experience problems in this area similar to those of
urban Indian women in the United States. Many Indian women must leave the reservation (U.S.)
or reserves (Canada) as victims of domestic violence. In the United States, some leave the
reservation because their tribes do not address domestic violence, as do the tribes whose law we
reviewed, or because no resources are available on the reservations. Others simply choose to
leave.
"' "Other women's shelters are unable to offer the access to traditional teachings, resources
and practices that can play such a powerful role in helping Indian women in crisis 'find their way
home.'" Id. at 1B (comments of Ellie Favell, Cultural Programming Coordinator for Eagle's
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Consequently, shelters which provide services specifically directed at Indian
women in urban centers are greatly needed. The Eagle's Nest, in St. Paul,
Minnesota, is such a program. 36 The program is the result of the work
of the Women of Nations, an advocacy group for battered American Indian
women. The program provides shelter to native victims and uses
traditional teachings, resources, and practices to overcome the damage that
results from the abuse. These practices range from burning sage and cedar
to calm the spirit to teaching traditional craftwork and survival skills.
Participation in spiritual ways familiar to Native women is also avail-
able. 337
In urban centers with large Indian populations, statistics reveal the
presence of native people at shelters and within the court system. 338 Just
as tribes cannot successfully address tribal domestic violence by adopting
the same approaches to domestic violence as the non-Indian society, neither
can individual Indian people and their families be expected to completely
benefit from programs operated for majority clients.339
The intertribal community is a resource which can be utilized to assist
in dealing with domestic violence in the Indian urban community. Urban
Indian centers, with the multi-tribal membership among service providers
and recipients, are important in providing varied and culturally appropriate
intervention services to Indian victims and offenders. Tribal input from
local reservations, from which the urban Indian community populations
come, can assist in efforts to assess the needs of the urban population.
State courts have jurisdiction when domestic violence occurs outside
tribal boundaries. 34  The state courts and human services allied in
Nest, women's shelter for Indian victims of domestic violence in St. Paul, Minnesota).
33 Id.
337 Id.
M For a three month period, July 1 through September 30, 1993, the Women's Community
Association, which operates the Women's Shelter in Albuquerque, NM, showed that it served 736
clients. Of that amount, 137 were Native American. San Juan County Domestic Violence Task
Force figures for 1993 show that Native Americans made up 36% of the population, and
comprised 29% of the family crisis clients, 40% of the victims and 40% of the suspects. San Juan
County has three towns, Aztec, Bloomfield and Farmington, which border the nearby Navajo
Nation. See FAMILY CRISIS CENTER, supra note 11, at 7.
31 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (1991) ("[I]ntervention strate-
gies based solely on the experiences of women who do not share the same class or race back-
grounds will be of limited help to women who because of race and class face different
obstacles.").
"4 But see Penobscot Nation v. Paul, 20 Indian L. Rep. 6101 (Penobscot Nation Judicial
System App. Div. 1993) (holding that Tribal court retains jurisdiction over violations of
protective orders regardless of whether violations occur within court's territorial limits on
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domestic law proceedings can work to cooperate with the urban Indian
organizations and centers as well as with local tribes. This cooperation
should also include state subsidies for services, like those subsidies
provided to other entities. Financially limited urban Indian organizations
and centers cannot be expected to relieve the state of its responsibilities for
intervention and its costs. Agreements between states and tribes are
essential so that the urban and reservation Indians can obtain culturally
appropriate and effective assistance to remove domestic violence from their
lives.34'
CONCLUSION
You see, we have power. Men have to dream to get power from the
spirits and they think of everything they can - songs and speeches and
marching around, hoping that the spirits will notice them and give them
some power. But we have power ... Children. Can any warrior make
a child, no matter how brave and wonderful he is?
Chona (Tohono O'Odham)"2
In the instance of the Cherokees, we are fortunate to have many
strong women. I have attained a leadership position because I am willing
to take risks, but at the same time, I am trying to teach other women,
both Cherokees and others, to take risks also .... Friends describe me
as someone who likes to dance along the edge of the roof. I try to
encourage young women to be willing to take risks, to stand up for the
things they believe in, and to step up and accept the challenge of serving
in leadership roles....
If I am to be remembered, I want it to be because I am fortunate
enough to have become my tribe's first female chief. But I also want to
be remembered for emphasizing the fact that we have indigenous solutions
to our problems. Cherokee values, especially those of helping one
another and of our interconnections with the land, can be used to address
contemporary issues.
Wilma Mankiller 43
Our review of some tribal methods of protecting women from
Penobscot Indian Reservation).
34, The Navajo Nation Code provides that foreign court orders shall be recognized and
accorded comity upon a determination of the foreign court's jurisdiction, NAVAJO TRIB. CODE
tit. 9, § 1666 (1993); see also CHEROKEE NATION CODE tit. 22, § 60.7 (1993) (providing
statewide validity of tribal court orders); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(D) (Michie Supp. 1995)
(stating "state courts shall give full faith and credit to tribal court orders of protection").
342 UNDERHILL, supra note 132, at 92.
343 MANKILLER & WALLIS, supra note 122, at 250-51.
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domestic violence affirms two continuing foundations in the life of
indigenous people in the United States. The first of these foundations is
the persisting role of the tribe as a sovereign, the first sovereign within the
national boundaries of the United States. Tribes retain their sovereignty in
the context of international law, especially in the law of nations relating to
indigenous people. International norms and emerging instruments,
however, address tribal people in the collective, as distinct groups within
a larger nation-state. The status and rights of indigenous women in relation
to their tribal communities have only recently been directly addressed in
international law. Consequently, it is the sovereignty of tribes within the
United States borders that most directly affects the way indigenous women
are protected in their tribal communities.
The power of the sovereign remains integral in drafting tribal law,
rendering judicial orders, and establishing intervention programs to protect
women. This is in contrast to other ethnic populations in the United States
who use non-governmental organizations to promote their interests. The
tribe's status as a separate governmental entity allows tribes to address their
concerns regarding the well being of women, families, and tribal members
through enactment of tribal law. The tribe's separate status affects the
relationship between tribes and the state and federal governments and it is
the tribe which provides the first line of protection to women within their
jurisdiction.
Second, this review addresses the societal resources which tribal
governments use in resolving family, clan, and tribal disputes, as well as
the use of cultural beliefs and practices in addressing domestic violence.
The resulting tribal codes, court orders, and intervention programs can be
distinct in multiple ways. The traditional models of tribal law and practice
contrast with the Euro-American approaches within the United States
borders, but some are distinct among the over 500 tribes. The use of
Peacemakers by the Navajo and the Seneca is one generalized response to
any relational dispute. The use of traditional marriage sponsors in Laguna
Pueblo, who take on a responsibility to the couple at betrothal expecting to
assist the couple if marital problems arise, is another. Each tribe's
experiences, in combination with other factors, produce a model of law and
practice tailored to a tribe's needs. In the aggregate, the tribes produce
many models. Yet underlying the tribal variation is the common world
view that is of key importance to American Indians. The indigenous
peoples of the Americas have a shared belief that achieving harmony and
balance are the goals of their societies.
Both men and women in a tribal society are guided by communal
rather than individualistic values; the pursuit of harmony and balance
1995]
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extends to the roles and responsibilities of each. Consequently, any
analysis of the way that tribes respond to the needs of female victims of
violence must include a concern for, and response to, the abuser, the
children, and other members of the extended family, clan, and tribe. A
strict gender equality model of law and practice ignores the traditional and
evolving ways in which tribal societies structure complementary roles for
their members. The constitutional equal-protection-based criticism of
Martinez reveals how narrow perspectives miss much about contemporary
tribal life. Besides ignoring the legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty, the
gender equality viewpoint fails to recognize both the indigenous peoples'
view of male/female relationships as complementary and the abilities of
indigenous people to conserve and innovate in order to promote tribal
interests and continuity. The approach of retraditionalization through
intervention programs, which restore men and women to complementary
relationships, relies on applying long-held tribal values in a contemporary
context. The tribal ability to use these customary values is demonstrated
when tribal nations select women as their governmental leaders and in
tribal efforts to protect women from violence.
While the tribal codes reveal some similarities to state codes, several
reveal an expansive view of the protected class of individuals and
relationships. The non-restrictive view of protected persons reflects the
belief and policy that violence reaches beyond individual victims within the
immediate family and damages the extended family and others in the tribal
community. The behaviors that trigger the protective measures include not
only the threatened and resulting injury to victims, but also to property.
Additionally, protected relationships can justify a legal response from law
enforcement agents and the courts. Especially noteworthy is the protection
provided by the Navajo tribe in the workplace and educational environ-
ment. If violence occurs or is threatened, the victim and others can invoke
protective measures.
The tribal courts mandate a mix of temporary and permanent remedies
that are both similar and dissimilar to those utilized in non-Indian
jurisdictions. Mandatory jailing for short-term cooling off, sentencing, and
mandatory completion of counseling and remediation programs bear some
similarity to state laws. Some tribal intervention programs operate on
culturally-based goals distinct from non-Indian programs; more is involved
than stopping the abuse cycle. The goal of intervention programs like the
Sacred Shawl Society is to restore victim and abuser to a functional and
productive status within the personal and tribal network. The problems of
alcoholism, drugs, poverty, inadequate housing, and high unemployment
among Indians are formidable, but the culturally-based programs do not
[Vol. 69:69
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allow these elements to excuse the abusive behavior. These contemporary
aggravations make difficult the critical task facing tribal people and their
government of using every resource, old and new, to promote the safety
and well-being of all members.
The tribal codes, court orders, and programs in this study demonstrate
the initial effort involved to deliver the justice promised in words. Like all
other governments, the tribes will be judged by their performance; the test
is whether women believe that tribal action affirmatively protects them.
The indigenous nations in this study provide encouraging models for
protecting women inseparable from the nations' distinct tribal sovereignty.
These tribes also demonstrate that the indigenous cultures within the United
States are vital contemporary societies, rather than mere historical artifacts.
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